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(S//REL) (DYS)FUNCTIONAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 
Laura K. Donohue* 
 
Many theorists consider secrecy inimical to liberal democracy. Precise examination of the role that it 
plays in contemporary government, however, including its strengths and weaknesses, has been limited.1 
This chapter, accordingly, lays out a functional theory of secrecy, considering its role in the three 
branches of government in four contexts:  deliberation, information security, law, and adjudicatory 
processes.  Whether and to what extent cloaking information advances the interests of the state and 
society varies according to how it operates in each category.  
The first area, deliberative secrecy, carries with it significant advantages.  It can facilitate 
informed debate and honest exchange, allowing individuals to alter their views without losing face and 
ensuring that the final determination is made on the merits.  This is the domain of advice provided to the 
President, closed Congressional hearings, and juror deliberations.  The nature of the deliberations alter, 
however, as the outcome approaches implementation of the law, adoption of rules, and resolution of a 
legal question.  Communications may become probative, if not dispositive, of the final rule, 
interpretation, policy, or decision.  Along this spectrum, the impact of secrecy shifts from facilitating 
open exchange to obfuscating the final finding, law, or judgment.  As it does so, the quality of the 
communication shielded from public scrutiny shifts from deliberative-secrecy to information-secrecy or 
secret law, in which capacity it may undermine the effective operation of a liberal, democratic state. 
The second category, information secrecy, masks factual data that the government obtains or 
generates.  It encompasses controls placed on material (e.g., classification, informal controls, and patent 
secrecy orders) as well as restrictions on government employees.  Secrecy functions in this realm to 
forestall efforts by individuals wronged from seeking justice through the courts.  Absent knowledge of 
how the executive wields its authority, neither facial nor as-applied challenges may be brought to limit 
government overreach.  Civil litigation also may be severely constricted, resulting in the failure to rectify 
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a wide range of grievances ranging from breach of contract and environmental damage, to wrongful death 
and personal injury.  The cost of cloaking how power is exercised is borne in litigation, civic engagement, 
and public debate.  “Official” interpretations may go unchallenged even as individuals with access to 
information increase their power within the executive and vis-à-vis the other branches and citizens.  To 
the extent that information-secrecy bleeds over into the other branches, attempting to bind their actions, it 
undermines the other branches’ ability to perform their constitutional functions. 
The third category centers on efforts to hide the law.  Secrecy here threatens the structure of the 
state itself.  It has a profound impact on the rule of law even as it radically augments the power of 
agencies deep within the executive branch.  By preventing access to law, it undermines the legality—and 
morality—of the rules themselves.  A legal system that hides law from the public may not, even in a 
positivist tradition, be said to exist.  Such secrecy raises question about the existence of a legal system. 
The fourth category, adjudicatory secrecy, masks the administration of justice.  In the courts, it 
may impact litigation, preventing the introduction of evidence, altering proceedings, and hindering 
publication of all or parts of judicial decisions.  State secrets doctrine may suspend litigation altogether.  
As a matter of process, courts may exclude all or some portion of the spectators.  Yet a defendant’s right 
to a public trial relies in part on public pressure to ensure that witnesses, prosecutors, judges, and juries 
act well.  Adjudicatory secrecy affects the public’s right to participate in the judicial process and to learn 
from it. Judges may hold trials in camera, or ex parte, increasing the potential for poor decision-making.  
It may conceal judicial decisions, undermining rights central to the liberal, democratic state. Like secret 
law, this is a particularly pernicious form of secrecy.  The reason, however, is slightly different than that 
offered in relation to the courts: as an executive act, it affects separation of powers and both structurally 
and substantively the protection of rights within the state.  
In each of these categories, secrecy presents obstacles to civil and criminal litigation and to the 
effective operation of the legal system writ large.  The question of precisely how and whether such 
interference is justifiable turns on the function of secrecy in each context. 
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1. Deliberative Secrecy 
Deliberative secrecy encourages honest debate and discussion.  Far from being a novel idea, the 
value of protecting inter-personal exchange extends to antiquity.  For Michel Foucault, the Greek concept 
of parrhesia [παρρησία], or truth-telling, lay at the heart of knowledge, power, and the self.2  It required 
that the individual believe that what he said was accurate and exhibit courage, even at the risk of 
damaging the relationship.3  As a matter of political interaction, parrhesia occurred during democratic 
assembly and between counsellors and the ruler.  The latter carried substantial risk: princes unable to 
accept the truth could (and did) kill individuals for what they said.4  Nevertheless, for counselors to be 
effective, they had to have the ability and the courage to tell the truth.5  Contemporary respect for the 
deliberative process reflects this inheritance.  It is animated by the idea that the governmental structure 
has to create space within which counselors, lawmakers, and jurors can be forthright.  
The deliberative process encompasses intercourse leading to a final decision.  In legal matters, we 
can think about the end point as the rule that is adopted, the statutory interpretation, or the final 
determination in a dispute.  The steps along the way exist on a continuum, starting with individuals, 
moving to communication between and among persons and entities, advancing to formal processes, and 
eventually resulting in a decision.  
All three branches in the United States recognize the importance of encouraging frank and open 
exchange by shielding a certain amount of deliberation from public scrutiny.  Certain Congressional 
hearings and private meetings between members of Congress, executive privilege centered on 
consultation between the President and her immediate advisors, and juror deliberations thus enjoy 
privileged status.  The point at which a decision is reached represents the formal construction of the rule, 
or the interpretation of the rule that serves as working law, to guide behavior.  At that point, the function 
of secrecy shifts from deliberative secrecy to secret law (see discussion in Part 3, infra). To the extent that 
what we might think of as “proximate deliberation” is relevant to understanding the final determination, 
then it exists, in some sense, outside the deliberative process as integral to the final rule.  
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As with deliberative secrecy, the importance of airing proximate deliberations to deepen public 
understanding of the final rule is recognized by each branch.  The Congressional Record publishes the 
deliberations of the full House and Senate.  Committees, by and large, publish their hearing transcripts.  
The Federal Register, in turn, contains the rules, proposed rules, and notices of federal agencies.  Every 
final rule adopted and published in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) includes not just a summary of 
the rule and the legal authority for its issuance, but also a summary of the rule’s purpose and analysis of 
public comments received.  Executive Orders and Presidential Proclamations (which, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, are published in the CFR) include within them the authority under which 
they are issued as well as the reasoning leading to the rule.  Federal courts, in turn, look to sources such as 
James Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers, and various anti-
Federalist papers to shed light on the Constitutional text, as well as the legislative history to shape 
statutory interpretation.  Appellate courts issue opinions that include the grounds on which their final 
determinations are made.  The reasoning supporting the holding establishes binding precedent, even as 
extraneous reasoning—i.e., dicta—may be probative, if not dispositive, in subsequent cases.6  Proximate 
deliberation in the judicial context incorporates not just the ruling on the question presented, but how the 
court comes to that conclusion.  
Proximate deliberation thus operates within a broader legal context, subject to the considerations 
in Part 3, below.  Outside of this realm, though, arguments for and against deliberative secrecy are largely 
consistent among the branches.  This section, accordingly, considers these debates before delving into a 
discussion of how deliberative secrecy functions within each branch. 
A. Weighing the Value of Deliberative Secrecy 
There are numerous arguments for masking political and legal discussion early in the deliberative 
process, before the proximate decision point is reached.  Each argument emphasizes the role that secrecy 
plays in yielding a better outcome.7   
First, deliberative-secrecy can facilitate candor and build trust between individuals.  This argument is 
ultimately a consequentialist one in which the goal is to get better ideas on the table.  Individuals may be 
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more willing to consider arguments put forward by individuals with whom they have a frank and open 
exchange.  Second, protecting deliberations may help to prevent outside parties and interest groups from 
exerting undue influence.  Money and politics can skew decisionmaking in favor of those with more power, 
potentially undermining coming to a better conclusion.  Third, secrecy may allow individuals to play devil’s 
advocate, considering alternative (and potentially unpopular) views, without being concerned about 
negative publicity that may result from entertaining different ideas.  By exploring alternative positions, 
decisionmakers can reach better results. Fourth, it can create space for individuals to be persuaded by 
arguments that are put forward and, thus, to change their positions.  By not becoming publicly tied to a 
particular position, decisionmakers may avoid the need to find a way to save face to reverse a prior course, 
ultimately reaching a better final result.  This argument evokes a deeply humanistic principle: it is only 
through full and frank discussion that one’s own ideas can evolve.  Fifth, as a structural and political matter, 
protecting the deliberative process may help to maintain the separation of powers, allowing each branch to 
operate without interference from the other organs of government.  Adhering to structural divisions may 
help to ensure that individuals (or branches) ambitious to influence the course of events are not able to 
overreach, thereby protecting individual liberty . 
Important drawbacks accompany these advantages.  By preventing public knowledge of the back-
and-forth that shapes the outcome, deliberative secrecy precludes outside parties from influencing the 
conversation.  This may have deleterious consequences on the substance or legitimacy of the final rule or 
decision.  Important expertise may be lost because others are not allowed into the conversation.  
Simultaneously, where the discussion involves a negotiation, it may be harder to get buy-in to the final 
agreement if key stakeholders are neither at the table nor allowed to contribute in a meaningful way to the 
design.  Voters may be confronted with merely a thumbs-up or a thumbs-down option, instead of having 
the opportunity to shape the final product.  Along the way, the less accessible decision-making is to the 
outside world, the more power those in the room accrue.  
Another drawback stems from the danger that what is decided may exceed the purview set for the 
deliberative body.  While this concern may be mitigated by requiring the final decision to be approved by 
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an external arbiter to evaluate the legitimacy of the action, at that point, it may be too late to disentangle 
various components of the agreement.  In an effort to advance at least some of the decisions, others may 
thus get swept into the process, leading to unexpected outcomes. 
An additional difficulty that stems from protecting the deliberative process is that once a decision 
is reached, it may be difficult to ascertain the intent behind the rule that is adopted.  While purposive 
arguments may be dismissed as non-conclusive, in some circumstances, they certainly can be probative of 
final meaning. Legislative history does provide some kinds of insight into the meaning of laws, while 
judges in their opinions must explain the basis of their decision-making.  No less relevant are the 
intentions of policymakers in the executive branch. Absent such insight, implementation and public 
understanding may suffer. 
To chart a normative path that allows for the advantages of the deliberative process and mitigates 
the risks, it is helpful to look more carefully at the function of secrecy within the respective realms. 
B. Legislative Privilege 
The United States has a long history of protecting legislative deliberation, adopting it during the 
Constitutional Convention and then including in the text of the Constitution.  Over the past few decades, 
though, legislative secrecy has significantly increased, with an attendant impact on public understanding 
of the law and the ability of citizens to hold the executive accountable through the courts. 
In May 1787, within days of meeting for the first time, delegates to what became the 
Constitutional Convention agreed to protect their deliberations from the “licentious publications of their 
proceedings” by vowing to keep them secret, masking their decision-making from those not present—
including, and particularly, the press.8  The rule they adopted forbade any duplication of journal entries.  
It also limited access to the journal only to members present, and it established “That nothing spoken in 
the House be printed, or otherwise published or communicated without leave.”9   
James Madison, whose scrupulous notes of the Convention provide much food for fodder, was 
one of the strongest proponents of secrecy.  As he explained to Thomas Jefferson, it “was thought 
expedient in order to secure unbiassed discussion within doors, and to prevent misconceptions & 
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misconstructions without, to establish some rules of caution which will for no short time restrain even a 
confidential communication of our proceedings.”10  Jefferson did not welcome the rule, lamenting to John 
Adams, “I am sorry they began their deliberations by so abominable a precedent as that of tying up the 
tongues of their members.  Nothing can justify this example but the innocence of their intentions, & 
ignorance of the value of public discussions.”11  Others similarly objected, but the decision had strong 
support among delegates.12  George Mason saw it as “a necessary precaution to prevent 
misrepresentations or mistakes; there being a material difference between the appearance of a subject in 
its first crude and undigested shape, and after it shall have been properly mature and arranged.”13  George 
Washington noted in his diary, “Attending in Convention and nothing being suffered to transpire no 
minutes of the proceedings has been, or will be inserted in this diary.”14 
The primary reason for the rule was to ensure that delegates were at liberty to discuss sensitive 
matters.  Secrecy, Madison explained, would “secure the requisite freedom of discussion,” even as it 
would also “save both the Convention and the community from a thousand erroneous and perhaps 
mischievous reports.”15 Additional rationales supported a certain amount of discretion—not least, the fact 
that while their formal purview was to amend the Articles of Confederation, as a practical matter, the 
delegates created an entirely new government.16  Privileged exchange had other benefits as well.  It 
allowed those present to propose ideas without fear of repercussion, encouraging more robust debate.  It 
also prevented delegates from becoming tied to their initial positions, allowing them to be influenced by 
argument and reason.  It protected the conversation from becoming unduly influenced by external groups.  
And it cloaked sausage-making from outside scrutiny, leaving the final product to be inspected on its own 
merits.  Mason considered it “a necessary precaution to prevent misrepresentations or mistakes; there 
being a material difference between the appearance of a subject in its first crude and undigested shape, and 
after it shall have been properly matured and arranged.”17  Jared Sparks, an early American historian, later 
related a conversation with Madison: 
Opinions were so various and at first so crude that it was necessary they should be long 
debated before any uniform system of opinion could be formed.  Meantime, the minds of 
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the members were changing and much was to be gained by a yielding and accommodating 
spirit.  Had the members committed themselves publicly at first, they would have 
afterwards supposed consistency required them to retain their ground, whereas by secret 
discussion, no man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was 
satisfied of their propriety and truth and was open to argument.  Mr. Madison thinks no 
Constitution would ever have been adopted by the Convention if the debates had been 
public.18  
The nascent constitution went on to recognize the importance of both democratic accountability and 
deliberative secrecy.19  The Journal Clause ensured public knowledge of how representatives voted (at 
least in regard to the preferences of a minority on certain matters).  It reflected a presumption of 
transparency in regard to the chambers’ deliberations.  It afforded the Senate and House the authority to 
determine the timing of the release of the information.  And it retained for each chamber the discretion to 
waive public release of information.  At the same time, it fell short of creating a universal right of 
physical access. 
A few points deserve notice.  While a majority, assumedly, could block access to deliberations, 
the Roll Call Clause ensured that just one-fifth of the membership could require publication of how 
representatives voted—a constitutional minimum for accountability.  This design created a presumption 
of openness but allowed for each house to determine, on a case-by-case basis, the extent to which 
deliberative secrecy would be maintained.  Ultimately, the Madisonian check, in conjunction with 
federalist pushback from the state legislatures, would help to demarcate the appropriate boundaries.20 
Directly elected by the people and ceded the responsibility of raising revenue, the House quickly 
adopted an open-door policy.21  The Senate, in contrast, initially followed the precedent set by the 
Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention: it met in secret and looked down on the House 
for the populist displays that marked the public gallery.22  It gave its first employee, the doorkeeper, strict 
instructions to prevent either the public or members of the House of Representatives from gaining access 
to the chamber while the Senate was in session.23  
  9 
Pressure steadily increased on the Senate, however, to admit the public—particularly from state 
legislatures, who had elected members of the chamber.  In 1794, Democratic-Republicans introduced a 
measure to allow for more openness.24  The proposed resolution cited the responsibility that 
representatives had to their constituents and to their states to make “all questions and debates” related to 
their legislative and judicial responsibilities public.25  North Carolina’s Alexander Martin explained that 
withholding such information undermined Senators’ accountability—the importance of which increased 
in proportion to the greater powers afforded the chamber.26  Publicity would allow for “abuse of power 
[and] mal-administration of office” to be “more easily detected and corrected”; it would prevent 
“jealousies, rising in the public mind from secret Legislation”; and it would instill greater confidence “in 
the National Government,” which was entrusted with securing and protecting the “lives, liberties, and 
properties” of the People.27  Accordingly, the resolution called for “a standing rule, that the doors of the 
Senate Chamber remain open while the Senate shall be sitting in a Legislative and Judiciary capacity, 
except on such occasions as in their judgment may require secrecy.”28  
Although the resolution was postponed,29 a dispute over whether Pennsylvania’s senator-elect 
(Albert Gallatin) met the constitutional citizenship requirements for office afforded Democratic-
Republicans another opportunity to press for open proceedings.  The Federalist majority, keen to avoid 
the bad press that may well follow a closed-door decision, acquiesced.30  Less than a fortnight later, the 
Senate agreed to open all of its deliberations to the public “so long as the Senate shall be engaged in their 
Legislative capacity, unless in such cases as may, in the opinion of the Senate, require secrecy.”31 
In addition to the Journal Clause, the Statement and Account Clause assumed representatives’ 
public accountability.32  The provision retained a similar discretion, although “all public Money” was to 
be included.  The Constitution granted no discretion in terms of what must be accounted for, even as it 
preserved a liberty for Congress to determine the manner in which the information was presented and to 
keep its debates about how such money should be spent private. 
Over time, the standard evolved for the Senate and House to hold most of their deliberations in 
public, with special rules for exceptional circumstances.  As Professor Dakota Rudesill observes, by 1800 
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open sessions were the default: “Thereafter the House and Senate retained rules allowing for secret or 
closed sessions to consider confidential information and presidential messages, treaties, and 
nominations,” but starting in the nineteenth century, “non-public proceedings were generally rare.”33  The 
pattern was “open full chamber sessions to debate and pass the law, with periodic full chamber closed 
sessions and regular closed committee work to consider non-public information.”34  
Reflecting this legacy, the rules of the House of Representatives provides for secret sessions, 
“[w]hen confidential communications are received from the President, or when the Speaker or a Member, 
Delegate, or Resident Commissioner informs the House that such individual has communications that 
such individual believes ought to be kept secret.”35  Since the War of 1812, the House has only met 
secretly, as a whole, on half a dozen occasions.36  Almost all involved matters of foreign affairs.  
The Standing Rules of the Senate similarly allow for sessions to be closed for legislative matters, 
as well as nominations and treaties.37  For the latter, sessions are presumptively closed unless a majority 
decides otherwise (which it frequently does).  The chamber requires that impeachment trials be closed.38  
Because the Senate has more explicit constitutional foreign affairs authorities than the House, as well as 
the power of impeachment, the Senate has met secretly considerably more times than its counterpart, but 
almost exclusively in relation to the matters specified above.39 
Although a presumption of openness accompanies Congressional deliberations, the practice of 
closed committee hearings has increased commensurate with the growth of the national security state and 
the establishment of its legislative counterparts.  While a certain amount of secrecy may be seen as a 
concomitant necessity in light of new and emerging threats, weapons, and technologies, the democratic 
costs associated with cloaking legislative deliberations raises significant concerns—particularly in light of 
overclassification.  The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) routinely close their hearings and refuse to release even redacted 
transcripts or summaries of the proceedings.  In 2016, SSCI shuttered nearly every hearing, holding 63 
secret sessions and only four open discussions.40  SSCI barred the public from 94% of its hearings.  In 
2017, the number of secret hearings skyrocketed to 75, with 17 remaining open, making 82% of SSCI’s 
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hearings closed to the public.  The following year, 83% of SSCI’s meetings were closed.41  Like its Senate 
counterpart, the HPSCI conducts most of its hearings behind closed doors.42  And it is not just the 
intelligence committees that are closing their hearings to the public.  Over the past two years, outside of 
nominations, the Senate Armed Services Committee has closed one out of every four hearings.43 
To the extent that what is at issue relates to free and open discussion removed from final 
determination, the decision to close hearings may result in members being able to consider measures more 
honestly and to ask hard questions.  But in the process, public education on such matters is lost.  To the 
extent that these hearings, moreover, function as a form of public oversight, and not merely discussion of 
how best to craft future legislation, additional complications follow.  Representatives cannot be held 
responsible as to how diligently they perform their duties if the public cannot see what they are doing or 
what is happening behind closed doors.  No more can the public understand how the executive is 
interpreting and implementing the law—or hold it responsible through the judicial system.  The cost is 
borne further in democratic engagement and potentially, once information is finally aired, in the political 
legitimacy of institutions that have been operating in unexpected ways outside the public gaze.  To the 
extent that Congressional activity involves oversight, moreover, the question of secrecy may leave the 
realm of deliberation and enter into other categories: namely, data secrecy and masking the law.  Here, as 
a normative matter, the decision to block public access is based on much weaker grounds. 
C. Executive Deliberation 
Like the legislature, from the earliest days of the Republic, the executive has sought to protect its 
deliberative processes.  There are limits, however,  on what can be considered within this realm and 
implications for the conduct of civil and criminal litigation as well as the structure of the state. 
One of the first questions of executive privilege in the newly-constituted government arose in the 
celebrated case of Marbury v. Madison.44  Charles Lee, Marbury’s attorney, subpoenaed Levi Lincoln, who, 
while acting Secretary of State, had been in the room with Thomas Jefferson when they found the 
undelivered commissions.  Jacob Wagner, Jefferson’s temporary secretary (pending Meriwether Lewis’s 
arrival), had neglected to enter the commissions into the record book, making Lincoln’s testimony critical.45  
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Lincoln, however, refused to answer on grounds of executive privilege: he stated “that he was not bound, 
and ought not to answer, as to any facts that came officially to his knowledge while acting as secretary of 
state.”46  Once the questions were written and provided to him, Lincoln offered a rationale beyond the mere 
provision of candid advice to the President.  As reported by Cranch, “1st. He did not think himself bound to 
disclose his official transactions while acting as secretary of state; and 2d. He ought not to be compelled to 
answer any thing which might tend to criminate himself.”47  Lee argued in response that “the duties of a 
secretary of state were two-fold.”  On the one hand, he had a duty to act “as a public ministerial officer of 
the United States, totally independent of the President.”48  In this capacity, “any facts which came officially 
to his knowledge . . . he was as much bound to answer as a marshal, a collector, or any other ministerial 
officer.” 49  In his second role, he acted as an agent of the President.  Here, he was “bound to obey his orders, 
and accountable to him for his conduct.”50  In this capacity, “any facts which came officially to his 
knowledge . . . he was not bound to answer.”51  Lincoln again objected, saying that “it was going a great 
way to say that every Secretary of State should at all times be liable to be called upon to appear as a witness 
in a court of justice, and testify to facts which came to his knowledge.”52  While he might have a duty to 
the court, he also had a duty to the executive. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s took the position that while deliberative secrecy was a valid exercise of 
executive power, and the Fifth Amendment prevented self-incrimination, nothing Lincoln had been asked 
to disclose could be considered confidential. To the contrary, it was “a fact which all the world have a 
right to know.”53  Lincoln capitulated.54  
The case underscored the distinction between factual information and confidential political and 
legal discussions that lead to decision points.  While the former fell outside of executive privilege, the 
latter fell well within the long-recognized principle that full and frank consideration of matters before the 
President required some level of private discretion.  The fact that Lincoln had seen that the commissions 
had been signed by the President John Adams and marked with the seal of the United States did not fall 
within executive privilege.  Nor was it beyond his purview to testify whether, to his knowledge, any of 
the commissions had actually been delivered. 
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Reflecting this legacy, the Courts and Congress have repeatedly recognized the validity and 
importance of executive privilege.55  While it is not to be invoked lightly, it is considered essential to 
executive deliberation.56  It is for this reason that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) includes an 
exemption for inter- or intra-agency memorandums or letters that contain attorney work-product.57  The 
purpose is not to protect secrecy per se, but, more specifically, the deliberative process.58  This includes a 
wide range of matters.59 
Nevertheless, there are limits as to what falls within the deliberative process.  Assuming that 
protection of the liberal, democratic government is the aim of the state, the extent to which separation of 
powers may be undermined serves as a useful marker for how to ascertain where the line ought to be 
drawn.  To the extent that executive privilege impairs accountability (to the public or to Congress), or the 
ability of the judiciary to fulfill its important constitutional functions, then a boundary is crossed.   
D. Judicial Matters 
There are myriad ways in which the judiciary, too, recognizes the importance of deliberative 
secrecy.  Grand juries proceed in secret, largely to ensure the free flow of discussion.  Outside of narrow 
circumstances, grand jurors, interpreters, court reporters, operators of recording devices, anyone 
transcribing recorded testimony, attorneys for the government, and any other individuals to whom 
disclosure is made are forbidden from disclosing any matter to come before the grand jury.60  Grand 
jurors’ votes can never be disclosed.61 In both criminal and civil cases, petit juries do not undertake their 
discussions in open court.  Nor is the public allowed to observe judges’ conferences at an appellate level.  
The Supreme Court, too, meets behind closed doors and communications in chambers are protected from 
public scrutiny.  It is only where the decision approaches the establishment of law, in the opinions 
themselves, that insight into competing considerations is made available. 
In contrast to proceedings in chambers, while deliberative privilege protects certain documents 
from discovery,62 although some exceptions apply (see CIPA discussion, infra), documents submitted to 
the court are, for the most part, open.  As a matter of deliberative secrecy, that makes sense, as the parties 
in a case are not direct advisors to the judiciary.  Instead, they are interested entities pursuing certain 
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claims.  They therefore fall outside the deliberative domain.  As with the legislature and the executive, to 
the extent that secrecy advances the interest of ensuring full discussion within the judiciary, such secrecy 
may well support (instead of undermining) liberal, democratic values and facilitate fundamental 
principles of fairness at issue in litigation.  But, as addressed in Part 3, as the discussion approaches a 
final judgment, the function of secrecy shifts to one that yields harmful results. 
 
2. Information Secrecy 
Another way in which secrecy may act within the legal system is to prevent certain types of information 
from coming to light.  A distinction can be drawn between factual data and what the Supreme Court terms 
“working law.”  Although information-control systems may be applied to both, the function that secrecy 
plays in regard to each is essentially different.63  This section thus considers the former, factual data, and 
describes two primary ways such information may be hidden from public view: material controls and 
restrictions on government employees. 
A. Material Controls 
The principal means by which the executive branch exercises control over information is by 
limiting access to data that the government generates and/or holds.  The first point to make here is that the 
concept of masking at least some information from the public inheres in sovereignty: states will, from 
time to time, need to keep certain information hidden to mitigate vulnerabilities.  It is with national 
security and foreign intelligence in mind, for instance, that Congress, from the beginning, expected and 
allowed for the executive to engage in expenditures outside the public eye.  In July 1790, the legislature 
passed An Act providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, 
authorizing the President to draw up to $40,000 annually from the Treasury, “for the support of such 
persons as he shall commission to serve the United States in foreign parts, and for the expense incident to 
the business in which they may be employed.”64  Capping the annual salaries, Congress required that the 
President “account specifically for all such expenditures of the said money as in his judgment may be 
made public, and also for the amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable not to specify.”65  
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In 1793, the Second Congress went on to pass a law stating, “That in all cases, where any sum or sums of 
money have issued, or shall hereafter issue, from the treasury, for the purposes of intercourse or treaty, 
with foreign nations,” the President would decide whether to release the amounts assigned or to certify 
the total of such expenditures.66  
These statutes acknowledged a sphere of secrecy. The executive, however, did not cabin itself to 
expenditures.  In the twentieth century, the government went on to adopt a classification regime, to 
institute informal controls, and to take steps to prevent certain scientific and technical knowledge from 
becoming public.  This section considers each of these spheres and posits that, to the extent that they 
enable the executive to protect national security, they further the interests of the state.  But to the extent 
that they interfere with public understanding of how the executive is wielding its constitutional and 
statutory authorities, or how the executive impacts the separation and balance of powers, they may impact 
the progress of civil and criminal litigation as well as the state structure itself. 
Classified and Controlled Unclassified Information 
The current classification system arose prior to World War II.67  In 1946, it split into two realms: 
National Security Information (NSI) as classified by executive order, and Restricted Data (RD), as 
defined in the Atomic Energy Acts.   
In the former category, nine primary executive orders and two subsidiary ones have been 
introduced since that time to control the dissemination of NSI.68  Under Executive Order 13,256, which 
currently controls NSI, classification can only be applied to matters related to (a) military plans, weapons 
systems and operations; (b) foreign governments; (c) intelligence operations; (d) foreign relations; (e) 
scientific, technological, or economic matters related to national security; (f) nuclear materials or 
facilities; (g) critical infrastructure; or (h) weapons of mass destruction.69  Not every member of the 
intelligence community (IC) has the authority in the first instance to classify materials.70  Original 
classification authorities (OCAs) alone can do so.  As of FY 2016, there were 2,215 OCAs (up from 
2,199 in FY 2015), who made nearly 40,000 original classification decisions.71  Another 55 million 
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derivative classifications followed—a number that underscores a frequently-voiced concern that the IC 
has a tendency to overclassify information.72  
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (and later 1954) classified nuclear discoveries from birth—even 
if funded and carried out by private citizens.73  The statute continued the comprehensive restrictions that 
had existed during the Manhattan project, labeling all information concerning the design, manufacture, or 
utilization of atomic weapons, the production of special nuclear material, or the use of special nuclear 
material in the production of energy RD.74  Starting in 1954, Congress added a new category of Formerly 
Restricted Data (FRD)—i.e., classified information removed from RD designation following a 
Department of Energy (DOE)/Department of Defense (DOD) joint determination that it relates primarily 
to atomic weapons and can be safeguarded similar to NSI.75 
Outside of NSI and RD, an unclassified regime controls public access to government information.  
In 2010, President Obama issued an executive order establishing Controlled Unclassified Information 
(CUI) as a replacement for Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) and other markings.76  CUI serves as a 
catch-all for matters related to citizens’ privacy, security, proprietary business information, and law 
enforcement investigations.77  The specific types of information included vary widely—ranging from 
agency data provided to law enforcement for investigations, to military records provided to former service 
members to facilitate benefits claims.  It may include medical data central to responding to diseases and 
epidemics, or demographic data helpful to researchers developing new technologies. 
The impact of formal classification and CUI on civil and criminal litigation depends on the type 
of data at stake.  Preventing the public from knowing the identities of foreign spies, the time at which a 
drug shipment is expected to cross the border, or the blueprints for advanced missile systems does not 
appear to directly harm—or even influence—the conduct of judicial processes.  The fact that information 
has previously been classified, moreover, does not necessarily retard prosecution.  The Classified 
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) allows for suits to move forward with special work-arounds to ensure 
that certain privileged information can be used at trial and that defendants will have an opportunity to 
respond to the charges levied against them.78 These suits can be challenged in terms of whether they 
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actually provide for sufficient discovery to mount a defense.  The court is placed in the position of 
determining whether secrecy is undermining the administration of justice.  
Some ways in which classification works may prevent citizens from seeing how their rights are 
being impacted.  If, for instance, the NSA obtains information about pending (ordinary) criminal activity 
through Section 702 incidental collection, and provides that information to the Drug Enforcement 
Agency—which then uses parallel construction to obtain the same evidence (thus masking the original 
use of foreign intelligence authorities)—then criminal defendants will never have an opportunity to 
challenge the statutory provision.79  Even if the Department of Justice (DOJ) adopts a policy of informing 
defendants when information “derived from” FISA provisions is being used, if it classifies the definition 
of “derived from,” the cloak of secrecy is maintained.  The criminal justice system relies on defendants 
knowing how the information has been obtained; this is the whole point of the notice requirement.  It 
allows defendants to mount facial and as-applied claims, keeping the exercise of prosecutorial power in 
check.  Information secrecy therefore may undermine the ability to mount such challenges.  
It is not just in the criminal realm that we see the impact of classification.  In 2017, New York 
University Professor Paul Light undertook a study of the federal government, finding that as of 2015, its 
true size was 9.1 million employees—a number that included civilian employees, active-duty military 
personnel, and contract and grant employees.80  Individuals in the last category made up more than 40 
percent of the workforce.81  Masking information about contractors’ activities via classification may have 
a significant impact on civil litigation across a range of areas: employment, environmental damage, 
intellectual property, wrongful death and personal injury, and the like.   
A similar phenomenon marks contractor use of state secrets as an affirmative defense, prompting 
U.S. intervention and dismissal of the suit at a pleadings stage.82 The numbers are growing: between 2001 
and 2009, the government asserted state secrets in more than one hundred cases, even as the doctrine’s 
shadow fell over dozens of others.83 Since then, there have been more than 200 cases involving claims 
that the suit cannot continue without revealing sensitive information.84 The doctrine has blocked 
complaints related to breach of contract, patents, trade secrets, fraud, and employment termination.85 It 
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has prevented wrongful death, personal injury, and negligence suits from moving forward, as well as 
cases brought against telecommunications companies for acting outside the law; torture suits; 
environmental degradation claims; breach of contract suits; and defamation litigation.86  The privilege has 
become a sort of private indemnity, excusing contractors from various forms of malfeasance. The 
executive also benefits from state secrets privilege, which masks how it uses its power.87   
In addition to the immediate impact on litigation, classification has a potentially broader impact 
on the legal system.  From a separation of powers perspective, the legislature is entrusted with 
oversight—a function it cannot perform if the executive branch can simply hide information from it.  The 
Senate and House, accordingly, retain the right to declassify material, even over Presidential objection.88  
The same is true of the committees that most often handle classified materials.  SSCI, for instance, 
controls access to its own records.89  Members of the committee may declassify witness names and make 
classified materials available to the rest of the Senate or to the public.90  HPSCI also has its own system 
for safeguarding sensitive information.91  As soon as information is obtained, it becomes committee 
material.92  The committee then controls who has access to it—including whether and when to make it 
entirely public.93 
As a constitutional matter, the executive orders that govern formal and informal controls on 
executive branch materials cannot be used to prevent the other two branches from airing or publishing 
their work for the simple reason that they are separate, co-equal branches.  One would think that this point 
does not even need to be addressed, if it were not for the Government’s recent contention to FISC that the 
executive alone can decide when and what portions of judicial opinions can reach the light of day.  This 
claim runs directly contrary to the concept of separation of powers.  When one branch of government 
attempts to classify the product of another branch, moreover, the type of secrecy at play subtly shifts: 
information secrecy morphs into efforts to mask the law itself, which, as Part 3 addresses, is the most 
dangerous kind of secrecy in a liberal, democratic regime. 
Patent Secrecy Orders 
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Patent secrecy orders also act to restrict public access to information, making it particularly 
difficult for inventors to recoup damages or to mount effective constitutional as-applied challenges. Like 
the classification regime, such restrictions date back to the mid-twentieth century.  The 1951 Invention 
Secrecy Act empowers the Commissioner of Patents to order that an invention be kept secret, neither 
published nor patented, where such disclosure “might . . . be detrimental to the national security.”94  The 
government does not have to have an interest in adopting the invention.95  It merely must conclude that 
the invention may harm U.S. national security.  Once the commissioner institutes an order, it becomes a 
criminal offense to tell anyone about the invention without authorization.  The statute allows inventors to 
seek compensation, but neither the order’s existence nor speculative damage are sufficient to support 
compensation claims.96  The inventor must provide concrete evidence to demonstrate actual damage.97  
The number of secrecy orders is steadily increasing.  In 2012, there were 5,327 orders in place.98  
In 2015, there were 5,579.99  This trend continued: by the end of FY 2018 (September 30, 2018), 5,792 
orders were in effect—the highest number in decades.100  Although many of the orders apply to inventions 
developed with government assistance, a significant number are placed on independent inventors, who 
neither work with, nor are funded by, the United States.  In 2016, for instance, of the 121 new secrecy 
orders, 49 applied to private inventors.101   
Despite the issues raised by these secrecy orders for First Amendment speech rights and Fifth 
Amendment takings prohibitions, few legal challenges have come forward to determine the 
constitutionality of the statute, and none have succeeded.102  It is difficult to establish damages claims 
when a patent has not been granted.  The first time the Court addressed this question was in 1982.103  In 
response to James Constant’s assertion that the secrecy order prevented him from marketing the 
invention, the Court stated: 
These conjectural and speculative claims must be rejected in toto.  Apart from plaintiff’s 
own conclusory ipse dixit testimony, the record is devoid of any probative evidence tending 
to show that the companies alleged to be potential “customers” were interested in plaintiff’s 
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unsolicited proposals, or that the secrecy orders interfered with plaintiff’s attempts to sell 
his system to these various companies.104 
The burden was on the inventor to petition the Commissioner of Patents to modify the secrecy order and 
allow him to market the invention.  
Constant I, as it has come to be called, is a remarkable decision not least because inventors have 
no access to the commissioner’s rationale and hence cannot use this rationale to challenge the 
designation.105  In a classified domain, evidence of whether the invention actually harms national 
security—or has been usurped by the government for its own use—is difficult to obtain.106  The courts, 
moreover, have interpreted the statute narrowly, insofar as damages can be awarded.  The claim must 
arise from placement of the order, or because the government uses the invention improperly 
(demonstration of which, in light of the potential use of classification, may be extremely difficult to 
obtain).107  Courts exclude nonmonetary damages and, at times, interest.108  Full-time USG employees 
may not seek damages.109  In addition, courts reject efforts to recoup attorneys’ fees, making even 
successful litigation more costly.110 One of the most recent cases, in 2014, was brought for failure to 
compensate inventors for a John/Jane Doe order placed on their invention, unjust enrichment, as well as 
for the constitutional failings of the statute.111  The invention in question related to an improved 
countermeasure for aircraft being attacked by infrared heat-seeking missiles.112  Once again, the claim 
failed—this time, because the order had been lifted in the interim, making the case moot. 
B. Employee Controls 
The second way in which the government may conceal information is by restricting government 
employees’ ability to speak. A variety of devices can be used in this manner, such as the security 
clearance process, employment contracts, termination agreements, statutory provisions, and statutory 
exceptions.  Such restrictions can prevent insight into the executive branch; ensure that there is no one to 
dispute official reports; result in a power imbalance vis-à-vis current and former employees, citizens, 
other agencies, and the legislature; erode First Amendment rights; reduce the amount and quality of 
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evidence presented in court; and dehumanize the bureaucracy by taking individual personalities out of the 
equation.  Each has implications for the legal system. 
In 2014, OMB reported that 5.1 million individuals (employees and contractors) held security 
clearances.113  As a condition, every single one was required to sign documents acknowledging that they 
would have access to sensitive information and accepting the consequences, such as administrative 
censure or the possibility of losing employment for faiing to keep the information secret, and a lifetime of 
pre-publication review.114  Statutory provisions provide further control.  Federal law makes it illegal to 
disclose classified information.115  Under the 1917 Espionage Act, it is illegal to gather, transmit, or lose 
defense information, to deliver it to aid foreign governments, or to harbor anyone who has engaged in 
either of the foregoing acts.116  The law forbids photographing, sketching, or selling pictures of defense 
installations.117  Other statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act, provide explicit exceptions to 
prevent government information from reaching the public domain. 
Speech control affects the legal system in numerous ways.  As with the classification of materials, 
it can prevent critical insight into the executive branch, making it difficult to determine when the 
government is acting according to the law. Fewer as-applied challenges may result.  And it may prevent 
facial challenges from ever being raised.  Although efforts to offset these consequences have been 
established through various whistleblower processes, they often prove ineffective.  
Unless employees speak out, classification may prevent even gross violations of the law from 
coming to light.  The discussion of the enhanced interrogation techniques relied extensively on 
government workers coming forward.118  The social and legal barriers to making such information public 
may be substantial: individuals must decide to break ranks with their agencies—a proposition difficult 
enough when procedures for reporting certain behavior have been established.  The decision may be 
compounded when classified documents have determined that the behavior in question comports with 
doctrine, as it did in relation to the NSA’s use of section 215 to collect telephony metadata.  Like secrecy 
in the classified materials realm, preventing employees from speaking on matters about which they are 
well-informed ends up harming the public democratic debate surrounding certain authorities.  Even where 
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employees may not reveal classified data, part of the importance of letting them participate in the debate 
rests on their insights—wisdom developed because of their close familiarity with how the law operates. 
When employees’ speech is tightly controlled, there is no one to counter the “official” position 
put forward by policymakers.  Nor is there anyone with direct knowledge of programs and operations 
who can question the “lessons learned” for future policy decisions.  Outside the public eye, there is no 
public pressure on the bureaucracy to act in a certain way, nor pressure from the bureaucracy on those 
making the decisions.  Consequently, the public dialogue—and strength of the law—suffers.  So when 
Vice President Dick Cheney states that interrogation works,119 or senior IC officials say that torture led to 
actionable intelligence,120 the public is not in a strong position to counter them in light of all potentially 
available evidence.  It is an assertion based on experience.  By preventing others with the same experience 
(or with more experience, because of their placement in the bureaucracy) from commenting, restrictions 
on government employees allow assertions to go unchallenged. 
Further distortion that occurs when only those who agree with top policymakers are allowed to 
contribute to the conversation.  There is evidence to suggest, for instance, that pre-publication review is 
only enforced against those critical of government.121  As one scholar has explained, “[D]isputes over 
redactions in a work favorable to an agency are almost nonexistent,” with only one case on record.122 
Another consideration relates to power.  Karl Marx, Max Weber, Michel Foucault, and others 
critiqued secrecy because of its intimate connection with disproportionate power.  Marx argued that 
bureaucracy “is a magic circle from which no one can escape.  Its hierarchy is the hierarchy of 
knowledge.”123  In the search for power, control of information proves paramount.124  Weber saw the 
bureaucratic state as the quintessential surveillance entity wherein access to, and control of, information 
provides those in power with the “mechanisms of repression.”125  Secrecy, “the things one declines to say 
or is forbidden to name,” presents less of an “absolute limit of discourse” and more of an element that 
functions alongside power: “There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the 
strategies that underlie and permeate discourse.”126   
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By preventing employees from speaking and/or contributing (freely) to the discourse, the 
government is more able to control the information and thus build its power.  When pre-publication 
review boards place conditions on authors that extend beyond merely reviewing the text that has been 
submitted, they abuse the employer-employee relationship.127  It is equally inappropriate for review 
boards to circulate authors’ drafts within classified circles, or for prosecutors unrelated to the review 
boards to then use the documents for their own purposes.128  It is a further abuse of power to hold authors’ 
publications hostage to competing agency interests, such as trying to prevent answering FOIA requests 
and, therefore, not allowing even unclassified information into the public domain.129 Power considerations 
extend beyond the disparate power held over society or employees, as, notably, the control of information 
is concentrated in a small portion of the executive branch.  So when Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
employees are prevented from discussing false charges brought against SSCI staff members in the midst 
of the committee’s enquiry into torture, the agency increases its power over the legislature.130 
A further concern is that allowing the government to quell employees’ speech erodes important 
Constitutional protections.  Rights suffer.  The First Amendment is not by any means unlimited.131  When 
the issue is critique of government action in relation to “matters of public concern,” the Court weighs the 
employee’s interests against the interests of the State.132  Where it is not a matter of public concern, the 
Courts grant wider latitude to the executive.133  The problem with this balancing test is twofold: first, 
national security is a particularly strong government interest, making allowance of employee speech in 
the most highly guarded sphere of the state the least likely to pass judicial muster.  Second, deference 
tends to reach into the deliberative privilege, confusing the distinction between the two. 
In 2015, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Oona Hathaway published an op-ed in the Washington 
Post, underscoring the myriad problems with pre-publication review.134  Not only do the criteria go 
beyond what is required to identify and protect classified information, but reviewers can broadly interpret 
their mandates, leading to a chilling effect.  In the interim, the review process takes longer than indicated, 
leaving authors with no recourse.135  The risk is that reviewers, by being selective about what they do or 
  24 
do not allow, and how long they delay publication (e.g., until just after a Congressional vote), can shape 
the dialogue according to their political interests. 
An additional impact on the judicial system has to do with evidence presented in Court.  Pre-
publication review means that not only are printed materials (from which attorneys could draw their 
arguments) unavailable, but live testimony and witness representation are also affected.  Justice may be 
denied, because of the absence of corroborative or exculpatory information, even as the role of the 
judiciary diminished. 
Courts consider pre-publication review to be constitutional.  In the first case to reach the courts, 
United States v. Marchetti, an employee signed two secrecy agreements: one when he joined the CIA and 
another when he left it.136  He went on to publish a novel and a number of articles, prompting the agency 
to seek an injunction.  The District Court ruled that Marchetti had to submit anything related to his 
classified work at the agency at least thirty days prior to publication.  In light of the 1947 National 
Security Act requirement that the CIA protect its sources and methods, the Fourth Circuit found that “a 
system of prior restraint against disclosure by employees and former employees of classified info 
obtained during the course of employment” was reasonable.137  What was unreasonable was the exit 
contract, which prevented publication of even unclassified information. 
The problem with the Court’s standard can be summed up in the legal principle of nemo iudex in 
causa sua. By classifying more information—a decision that unreviewable by any but the OCA—the CIA 
can expand its power to prevent almost anything from coming to light.  The Court only partially 
addressed this concern, noting that if information was already “in the public domain,” then Marchetti 
could republish it.  But even this theory has been roundly attacked by executive branch on the grounds 
that allowing such publication could confirm potentially classified material. The Court added two 
requirements: the CIA had an obligation to “act promptly to approve or disapprove any material” and, in 
the event that the author disagreed with the pre-publication decision, he could seek judicial review.138  But 
such review explicitly excluded the original classification decision. 
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Several years after Marchetti, Snepp v. United States reached the Court.139  Frank Snepp 
published a book based on his eight years’ service with CIA.  Upon leaving the agency, he, too, agreed 
not to publish any information (either classified or unclassified) about the agency or intelligence 
collection without obtaining prior approval.  The Court decided that Snepp had been in a position with 
“an extremely high degree of trust.”  Therefore, it did not matter whether his book contained classified 
information or not.  Its publication could cause irreparable harm. A scholarly debate ensued.  Congress 
urged the executive branch to allow former employees to speak.140  President Reagan did the opposite:  
National Security Decision Directive 84 required pre-publication review for all individuals with SCI 
clearances.141  Congress balked.142  Reagan did suspend the lifetime pre-publication review 
requirement,143 but it had little impact, because individuals still had to sign other agreements that had the 
same effect, in order to gain access to SCI.144  Pre-publication review became standard procedure.145 
A final consideration in the government’s effort to stifle employee speech centers on the way in 
which it dehumanizes government.  When all that is allowed into the public domain are policy statements 
and broad, sweeping generalizations from top officials, important details remain hidden. Individuals 
lower down the ladder can often provide more accurate information.146 
 
3.  Secret Law 
The most dangerous form of secrecy in a liberal, democratic state is secret law.  By law, I mean 
rules that require obedience.147  Statutes setting out the conditions under which the executive can operate 
or specify how citizens must act differ in important respects from turning the provisions into working law 
or interpreting them to determine whether an executive action comports with either the legislative framing 
or the dictates of the constitution.  All three types of law—static, working, and interpretive law—operate 
in a liberal, democratic state.  To the extent that secrecy prevents such decisions and rules from entering 
the public domain, it presents a profound challenge to the legitimacy of the legal system. 
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A. Static Law 
Static law incorporates legislative products, amongst which classified transcripts, annexes, reports, 
appendices, appropriations, and supplements increasingly obfuscate the law.148 Professor Rudesill’s 
masterful treatment of Congressional processes details how these forms of secrecy present.  
As Rudesill explains, since 1979, SSCI and HPSCI have overseen the annual Intelligence Authorization 
Act (IAA), which now governs the National Intelligence Program.149 This legislation typically has a short 
section of Public Law text giving legal force to a detailed classified addendum, as well as brief mention of 
this legal maneuver in unclassified committee reports, which focus primarily on intelligence agencies’ 
pensions and public matters.150  The same year that the intelligence committees began legislating via 
classified addenda in the IAA, the Appropriations Committees started writing classified annexes and 
referencing them in the unclassified reports associated with the annual DOD Appropriations Act 
(DODAA).151  This statute provides funding for DOD activities ranging from operations related to the 
Global War on Terrorism and drug-interdiction and counter-drug activities, to military operation and 
maintenance and research and development.152  Since passing the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for fiscal year 1983, the Armed Services Committees have also attached classified addenda.  This 
legislation provides the framework for the Defense Department—including the Military Intelligence 
Program.153  Starting with fiscal year 1990 the Public Law text of the NDAA began giving legal force to 
classified addenda, with the DODAA following suit the subsequent year.154  
The rationale behind using such devices was that it was the only way to regulate classified programs.155 
But by making them secret, Congress prevented the public from apprehending the scope of the law as 
applied—including the very structure of the intelligence community. 
It could be argued that unclassified committee reports and the parts of the classified addenda that are 
similarly mere commentary or descriptive report language are not technically part of a statute. As Rudesill 
recognizes, they might provide an explanation for each section of an act, or summarize what the committee 
decided or comments of particular Members, but these reports do not come to the full House or Senate for 
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a vote and are not signed by the President.156 The President may not even have access to the classified 
addenda at Presentment.  
Yet Congress and the executive branch agree that the Public Law provisions referencing provisions in 
the classified addenda do give those classified provisions legal force.157  In five of the seven years prior to 
Rudesill’s analysis, the NDAAs included explicit incorporation language.158 DOD Appropriations Acts 
prohibit the agency from moving money among the accounts in a manner that departs from the allocations 
in the classified addenda.159 Reports that accompany the bills for signature in the Oval Office, moreover, 
takes a similar stance: of 32 IAAs since 1979, most have been accompanied by unclassified last-in-time 
reports which emphasize that the classified Schedule should be considered part of the statutory text, or that 
the annex should be considered part of the authoritative document.160 Courts, for their part, look to 
legislative history to understand the intent behind the introduction of statutes to probe the full meaning of 
the written text.161 
Congress defends the practice by citing to the fact that it has passed clandestine measures on numerous 
occasions—apparently unaware that it is establishing its own form of stare decisis, wherein repetition 
carries with it its own legitimacy—rather underscoring the concern that Congress is creating secret law.162 
In the meantime, the number of classified annexes appears to be increasing.163 
While the above examples focus on intelligence programs, they are not the only area in which 
Congress has introduced secret law.164 To the extent that the NDAAs and DOD Appropriations Acts 
incorporate the Classified Annexes into Public Law, and not just the Classified Schedule of 
Appropriations (or Authorizations), the realm of secret law is even broader. As Rudesill notes, these 
annexes establish what the government must and cannot do, with unknown and potentially broad 
implications for public policy and individual liberties.165 The annexes bind the government. They act as 
law. They fund and otherwise govern classified activities—from NSA’s surveillance apparatus to lethal 
drone programs, which plainly do, or could, implicate basic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 
 B.  Working Law 
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Working law refers to authoritative executive branch interpretations and understandings of their 
statutory and constitutional powers (as well as those of the other branches).166  It differs from deliberation 
in that it represents a final decision point that then becomes binding.  Presidential orders, regulations, 
opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and internal agency guidelines provide just a few 
examples of areas in which secret working law may present.167 
In 1935, Congress created the Federal Register.  The law requires publication of all “Presidential 
proclamations and Executive orders, except those not having general applicability and legal effect or 
effective only against Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as officers, agents, or employees 
thereof.”168  Congress and the President have the authority to add additional documents to the register for 
publication.169  Any document or order that carries a penalty is deemed to be of general applicability and 
legal effect.170  At the close of each year, everything published in the Federal Register is placed in Title 3 
of the Code of Federal Regulations. While the default is promulgation, the law provides for an exception 
“In the event of an attack or threatened attack upon the continental United States.”171  Under such 
conditions, if the President determines that publication “would not serve to give appropriate notice to the 
public of the contents or documents,” he or she may suspend any part of the requirements for publishing 
the documents in the Federal Register.172. Not all documents that the President signs and that have legal 
effect must be published.173  Some are issued through the National Security Council, and many of these 
remain classified.  There are also oral presidential directives, which are equally binding.  Despite the 
clandestine nature of these documents, the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has “consistently 
advised” the President that they are controlling.174  These documents govern the executive branch.  
Presidents routinely distinguish between “decision directives” and “review directives,” providing 
each with a different abbreviation.175  To date, President Donald Trump has issued just one kind of 
presidential directive: National Security Presidential Memoranda (NSPMs), which include, inter alia, a 
direction to the Secretary of Defense to come up with a plan to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(NSPM 3) and a reinstatement of the ban on U.S. citizens travelling to Cuba (NSPM 5).176  NSPM 7 
establishes national security threat categories, directs the integration of information related to national 
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security threat actors, and makes way for algorithmic analysis of biometric, biographic, and other 
personally-identifiable information obtained by the intelligence community.177  The exercise of such 
programs could have a deep impact on citizens’ rights, yet they emanate not from the legislature but from 
the executive. 
It would be difficult to find a better example of working law than the legal opinions issued by the 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). They contain independent legal analysis that is considered binding on the 
executive branch.178  OLC’s “Best Practices” documents emphasize the importance of stare decisis: 
outside of extraordinary circumstances, future opinions must conform to earlier ones, unless the prior 
opinion has been withdrawn.179  At times, however, OLC insulates its opinions from public view, with the 
result that a secret jurisprudence now operates within the executive branch.180  
FOIA requests prove inadequate to unearth OLC opinions, despite the statute’s goal of 
eliminating secret law.181  FOIA requires federal agencies to publish “substantive rules of general 
applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general 
applicability formulated and adopted by the agency,” in the Federal Register.182  A person “may not in 
any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by” a rule that should have been published in 
the Federal Register but was not.183  The reading room provision requires that each agency “make 
available for public inspection” in electronic format all “final opinions, including concurring and 
dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases.”184  They also must make 
available “those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency and are 
not published in the Federal Register.”185 Under FOIA, certain information held by the executive is not 
subject to disclosure.  This includes “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,” but 
only insofar as their production could reasonably be expected to either (a) interfere with law enforcement 
proceedings, or (b) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.186  The statute also excludes 
matters that are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret 
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and [] are in fact properly classified pursuant to such 
Executive order.”187  The burden is on the agency to demonstrate that an exemption applies.188 
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In NLRLB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., a unanimous Supreme Court understood FOIA to require all 
federal agencies to publish their “working law.”189  The Court pointed to the reading room provision as 
representing “a strong congressional aversion to ‘secret law’” as well as “an affirmative congressional 
purpose to require disclosure of documents which have ‘the force and effect of law.’”190  While pre-
decisional or deliberative documents may be withheld under FOIA exemption five, the final decisions 
must be released.191  The DOJ nevertheless argues that OLC can never generate working law—a claim at 
odds with its assertion that OLC opinions are binding.192  If they are binding,  they have the force of law.  
In some cases, such as the Terrorism Surveillance Program or the use of enhanced interrogation, it is only 
OLC analysis that undergirds programs. 
In 2016, Congress contemplated legislation that would have required the executive to release 
legal opinions that reflected “controlling interpretations of law.”193  It also would have required release of 
any “final reports or memoranda created by an entity other than the agency” making final decisions, as 
well as “guidance documents.”194  Congress did not pass the measure, however, opting instead to pass a 
FOIA reform bill.195 
C. Interpretive Law 
Interpretive law incorporates judicial decision-making, where secrecy operates to masque 
statutory construction, constitutional analysis, and government malfeasance, raising constitutional 
concerns.  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) provides a good example. 
In 1978, Congress introduced FISC, and the appellate Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 
(FISCR) to consider whether the government had demonstrated probable cause that an individual was a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and that the individual would use the facilities to be placed 
under surveillance, prior to issuing an order for electronic surveillance.  At no point did Congress address 
the possibility that the FISC would issue opinions involving complex matters of statutory construction 
and constitutional interpretation, which would become binding precedent.  Nevertheless, there are now 
more than 70 declassified and redacted FISC opinions and more than 270 orders in the public domain—
and potentially numerous other opinions that remain classified. These decisions deal directly with matters 
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that may have a profound impact on individual rights and which cry out for public discussion and debate. 
The Section 215 telephony metadata program provides an excellent example.196   
For years, the government’s contention, and court’s acceptance, that language in the USA 
PATRIOT Act could be read broadly to authorize the collection of nearly all Americans’ telephony 
metadata, remained secret.  In 2013, when the existence of the secret legal interpretation became publicly 
known, the outcry reverberated in all three branches.  The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB), which had floundered since its creation, took form and issued its first report, in which it found 
that the government had engaged in illegal surveillance.197  The body called for the immediate cessation 
of the program.  The President appointed the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies, which issued a lengthy report sharply criticizing the statutory interpretation and calling for 
an end to the program.198  The President went on to issue PPD-28 to try to restore domestic and 
international confidence in the U.S. intelligence community.199  In the courts, numerous cases challenged 
the program.  The Second Circuit called the statutory interpretation “unprecedented and unwarranted” and 
ruled that it violated the act.200  In Klayman v. NSA, Judge Leon granted an injunction against the NSA, 
calling the program “Almost Orwellian” and “almost certainly unconstitutional.”201  FOIA requests and 
suits suddenly exploded: in one, the Electronic Frontier Foundation requested “all decisions, orders, or 
opinions issued by FISC or FISCR between 1978 and June 1, 2015, that include a significant construction 
or interpretation of any law.”202  In Congress, from only three bills the prior year (addressing a clause in 
FISA that sunset that year), the year following the revelations saw the introduction of 42 bills containing 
wide-ranging proposals that included changes to the manner of appointment to the FISC/FISCR and the 
FISC/FISCR process, as well as requiring the release of all FISC/FISCR opinions and orders. Congress 
ultimately adopted a provision requiring that the Director of National Intelligence in consultation with the 
Attorney General publicly reveal any significant construction or interpretation of the law, including (to 
the extent consistent with national security), “ a description of the context in which the matter arises and 
any significant construction or interpretation of any statute, constitutional provision, or other legal 
authority relied on” by the FISC/FISCR.203 
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Part of the reason for the outcry was that the Court’s decision in regard to telephony metadata 
essentially created new law, without any of the protections that otherwise mark statutory interpretation: 
adversarial debate, open court, and a published opinion.  Instead, a handful of individuals deep in the 
executive branch, with approval from judges on a secret court, adopted a sui generis understanding of the 
statutory law. 
Another way in which the structure of clandestine judicial decision-making presents issues for the 
legal system is through its impact on constitutional interpretation.  In her 2013 memorandum opinion on 
bulk collection, Judge Egan, citing just one Supreme Court decision, dispatched any Fourth Amendment 
concerns.204  She relied entirely on Smith v. Maryland—a case directly relevant, yet inadequate in light of 
the changed technologies at hand.205  The opinion did not even mention First Amendment concerns.  The 
Court did not provide any detailed legal reasoning based on careful legal argument.  Yet it was binding on 
future decisions.  When the court creates an entirely new exception to the Fourth Amendment—as it did 
in regard to the “special needs” exception—secrecy is particularly worrisome.  In In re Directives, FISCR 
looked back at its decision in In re Sealed Case to confirm “the existence of a foreign intelligence 
exception to the warrant requirement.”206 Although FISCR had “avoided an express holding that a foreign 
intelligence exception exists by assuming arguendo that whether or not the warrant requirements were 
met, the statute could survive on reasonableness grounds,” the Court went on to find, for the first time, a 
foreign intelligence surveillance exception to the Fourth Amendment: 
The question . . . is whether the reasoning of the special needs cases applies by analogy to 
justify a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement for surveillance 
undertaken for national security purposes and directed at a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.  Applying 
principles derived from the special needs cases, we conclude that this type of foreign 
intelligence surveillance possesses characteristics that qualify it for such an exception.207 
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There was no party to appeal to the FISCR, or from the FISCR to the Supreme Court, much less any party 
to challenge the government’s argument in the first place.  Like the FISC/FISCR, the DOJ considers 
FISC’s opinions and orders to be precedent.208 
When the Snowden documents exploded on the public scene, Congress took steps to “end secret 
law.”209  The USA FREEDOM Act required the FISC to appoint at least five amici who could be asked 
for comment when any novel questions of law were presented.  It also required that FISC opinions 
undergo declassification review.  However, neither of these measures adequately addressed the structural 
concerns.  
There are problems with these fixes.  Amici are not adversarial parties.  They are only present 
when requested by judges.  Even when called, they have no formal right of appeal.  They operate under an 
abbreviated timeline, compared to their government counterparts, and the resources available to them are 
only a fraction of what is made available to the government.  Mandatory declassification review, in turn, 
does not mean that the opinions are necessarily declassified.  The executive still controls what 
information is, and is not, made public.  This is troublesome when the intelligence agencies are engaged 
in activities with a direct impact on individual rights.  It is hardly a disinterested observer where its own 
interests are concerned.  In the interim, the precedential quality of the opinions and orders persists. What 
were intended to be merely determinations of the sufficiency of showings of probable cause have become 
binding on future courts. 
Yet another way in which secret law operates within the judiciary is to restrict oversight—not just 
of the executive, but also the legislature and the judiciary. Ordinary legal procedures provide insight into 
how individuals, groups, private entities and public bodies act.  Briefs, motions, memoranda, oral 
arguments, and final opinions provide tremendous detail on how the law is being put into practice, as well 
as on how entities are acting.  Once this information becomes public, citizens have a range of further 
actions they can take. Where companies are involved, citizens may take the information that has been 
generated and decide to boycott their goods or services.  They may pressure their legislators to pass new 
laws to regulate certain behavior.  This opportunity is lost when the information never reaches the public 
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domain.  Where government actors are involved, citizens have yet more recourse, such as pressuring 
officials to fire them, encouraging elected representatives to pass new laws, or, in the Madisonian 
solution, voting people out of (or into) office.  
Making the opinions public yields information not just about government malfeasance (although 
certainly that), but also about the role that legislators may be playing in enabling actions that adversely 
impact rights.  SSCI and HPSCI perform oversight functions of the IC.  When the Snowden documents 
were released, part of the public’s strong response was directed towards the elected representatives on 
these committees who were responsible for performing oversight.  While Senators Ron Wyden and others 
had been sounding the siren for some time, others were immediately seen as culpable in the widespread 
violation of Americans’ rights.  Senator Dianne Feinstein took to the road to defend the legislators’ role, 
for the first time having to answer to her constituents for her behavior behind closed doors.  For 
representative democracy to work, citizens need to be apprised of how their legislators are acting. 
The failure to publish judicial opinions also impacts the public’s ability to perform oversight of 
the court.  This oversight is important in two respects: first, to hold the Courts responsible for the manner 
in which they are performing a check on the other branches; and, second, to hold the judiciary responsible 
for its own actions. 210 
D. Beyond Litigation: The Existence and Morality of Law 
What the forms of secret law in each branch have in common is their profound impact on the 
existence and legitimacy of the legal system.  In Western jurisprudence, lack of publicity means, at some 
level, that the law no longer exists.  Neither does it carry moral qualities that entail a duty of obedience.  
These ideas are far from new.  They extend across natural law, the liberal democratic tradition, and legal 
positivism.  And they are central in understanding the impact of secrecy on the legal system.  
Natural Law and the Liberal, Democratic Tradition 
Natural law saw legal rules as a way of shaping—by providing a basis for—action. In this 
tradition, law generates a moral obligation to obey which, in turn, depends upon the morality or justice of 
the law.  As developed in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and St. Augustine, “Lex iniusta lex non 
  35 
est.”211  In addition to being consistent with divine and natural law, to be just, human-created laws have to 
follow certain rules related to procedure and substantive fairness.  For one, they must be made publicly 
available.212 For another, they must be actively promulgated by the governing power within the governing 
power’s authority.  Such laws “bind in conscience.”213  In the natural law tradition, the absence of the 
required elements—which include promulgation—means that the law is no longer binding.214  While 
there might be other reasons to obey it, such as upholding a legal system that is otherwise just, the law 
itself lacks the moral requisite of obedience.  Law is “nothing other than a certain dictate of reason for the 
Common Good, made by him who has the care of the community and promulgated.”215  It must be 
available for it to be considered just. 
Early liberal democratic theorists adapted the concept of natural law to political obedience.216  
Immanuel Kant’s commitment to human freedom shaped the concept of the social contract, offering 
reason as a determinant of the moral qualities of law.  In Kant’s work, as well as that of more recent 
natural law theorists such as Professors John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin, secrecy is an undesirable 
trait.217  It prevents transparency and therefore undermines accountability.  What debate there is over 
secrecy boils often down to open versus closed government.218   
This approach relies heavily on a Lockean framing: that government rests on the consent of the 
governed.  The contours are well-established and hardly bear repeating: it falls to the state to protect 
certain rights, from which individuals cannot divest themselves.219  Other rights may be relinquished in a 
contractual relationship, in which individuals leave a state of nature and enter into society.220  When the 
government ceases to act according to the social contract—either in the protection of rights or the 
functions of government—then the people, who retain the supreme power, have not just the right, but the 
duty to withdraw consent.  In such a political order, the people must necessarily be apprised of the actions 
of the state, in order to judge, consistent with their consciences, what duty of obedience remains.  
Secrecy thus presents an obstacle to the fundamental precepts of liberal, democratic government 
and the right of rebellion.  Locke goes further in his Second Treatise, noting that when either the 
executive or the legislature ceases to protect individuals in their lives, liberties, and estates; a majority is 
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of similar mind; and each man in his own conscience satisfied that the conditions are met, then 
individuals have not just the right but the duty to rebel.  Thus, knowing the extent to which the executive 
or legislative powers have departed from their contract becomes paramount in ascertaining the point of 
departure.  The right of rebellion similarly requires a duty of openness in laying out the grievances 
precipitating a change in government.  The primary concern, insofar as secrecy presents, is in regard to 
political control. 
Closely related to the principle of liberal, democratic structure is the importance of eliminating 
secrecy as a matter of morality.  In the second appendix to Perpetual Peace (“Eternal Peace”), Kant puts 
forward his transcendental formula of public law: that “all actions which relate to the right of other men 
are contrary to right and law, the maxim of which does not permit publicity.”221  This claim provides a 
sharp contrast to Machiavelli’s embrace of any means to the required ends.  Kant’s formulation came to 
symbolize the Enlightenment.222  As Professor David Luban explains, Kant’s principle rests on the 
necessity of ordinary citizens having knowledge of political and legal affairs and thus being able to reflect 
on them without receiving direction from others.223  As long as citizens know how the rights of others are 
being impacted, they will be able to scrutinize government action and to determine whether it is acting in 
an appropriate manner.  For Kant, the publicity principle carries with it a moral quality, an expression of 
reason.  Luban explains that it amounts to requiring governors to asking themselves, “Could I still get 
away with X action, if that act, and the reasons for doing it, were publicly known?”224  If not, then the 
action lacks moral strength.225  Kant’s publicity principle is not absolute, but it points to the importance of 
consent and the necessity of transparency for democratic deliberation.  It carries with it both a legal and a 
moral quality, within which institutional design matters.226   
Modern natural law theorists similarly emphasize the importance of the promulgation of the law. 
Professor John Finnis posits that the justness of a law depends in part upon whether the law has been 
made publicly available.227  While, for him, failure to publish the law does not mean that it does not 
exist—just that it is not “law in the fullest sense of the word”—the fact that it does not carry the necessary 
elements of law means that it no longer commands our reasons for acting in certain ways.  There may still 
  37 
be a reason to comply with such laws (e.g., to ensure that the legal system, as a whole, is not undermined), 
but the existence of the law itself is not one of them.228 
Within the liberal, democratic tradition, promulgation of the law is central to rule of law.  It is 
non-negotiable—the golden rule.  Along with principles such as no retroactive law, it has become one of 
the pillars of how we think about law.  Within the rule is the recognition that the law acts to constrain the 
governors and that democratic deliberation depends upon citizens knowing what the government is doing.  
The liberal democratic tradition goes so far as to recognize that when the governors act in certain ways, it 
is not just the right but the duty of the people to rebel.  There is no room in this construct for hiding 
government action.  The purpose of the governmental structure is to protect the rights of citizens.  It 
therefore follows that citizens must know when their rights are being impacted by government actions.  
This becomes a second foundational tenet of the liberal, democratic tradition. 
Legal Positivism 
Legal positivism rejects the natural law tradition insofar as the internal morality of the law is 
concerned.229  Nevertheless, it proves equally hostile to secret law. Professors H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz 
thus considered legal rules to be social norms, whence the requirement of obedience arose.230  Hart’s rule 
of recognition serves as the foundation for his approach.231  Central to his account is the importance of 
citizens and officials being cognizant of what the law is and how it is being implemented.  It requires 
officials to identify deviation.  To the extent that the rule of recognition is not merely a convention, but 
also carries with it a duty of obedience, knowledge of its precepts becomes a necessary condition of 
conformity.  So, too, with the primary rules, as crafted by the rule of recognition.232  Secrecy has no place 
in Hart’s approach, it being a necessary condition of the existence of the law that the rules be known. 
In the mid-twentieth century, Professor Lon Fuller rose to prominence as he attacked legal 
positivism for ignoring the internal morality of the law.233  He posited, instead, a sort of secular natural 
law with eight principles of legality.  He separated form from substance: whether actual measures 
introduced consistent with the norms were desirable, in a normative sense, could be distinguished from 
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the existence of the norms under which substantive law was passed.  Without these essential attributes, no 
legal system could function.234  They defined rule of law. 
Fuller’s eight conditions focused on procedural norms that served to achieve social order by 
guiding human behavior.  They included, first, that there be rules.  He understood this as a requirement of 
generality.  Consistent with a principle of fairness, issues “must [not] be decided on an ad hoc basis.”235  
Second, the rules had to be widely promulgated so as to ensure that society at large knew their remit and 
the standards to which they were being held.  Third, Fuller rejected retroactive rule-making and its 
application to individuals, as it would be virtually impossible to regulate human behavior a priori, 
according to rules that had yet to come into being.  Fourth, Fuller emphasized the importance of well-
written law: it must be understandable, as well as, fifth, not contradictory.  Sixth, the law had to be limited 
to conduct that could be required, consistent with the abilities of those impacted.  Seventh, the laws should 
remain more or less constant over time, with little variability.  Eighth, the law as written and the law as 
applied must be consistent. For Fuller, “A total failure in any of these eight directions does not simply 
result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all.”236 
Fuller did not claim that every system containing the eight elements ought to be considered moral.  
As opponents quickly pointed out (and Fuller did not deny), one could easily conceive of a society in 
which, despite the existence, promulgation, internal consistency, and generality of the laws, their 
substance might nonetheless be considered morally reprehensible.  The insight that Fuller brought was 
that procedures themselves carry a moral importance and help to determine whether certain rules ought to 
be considered a legal system.  
As Professor Matthew Kramer explains, Fuller’s approach recognizes two aspects of rule of law.  
On the one hand, it lacks any inherent moral quality.  It can be used for benign or malignant purposes.  It 
“is indispensable for the preservation of public order and the coordination of people’s activities and the 
security of individuals’ liberties.”237  Simultaneously, such form is essential for perpetrating significant 
harm.238  Thus, the criteria can be understood as just a “general juristic phenomenon,”—i.e., “nothing 
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more and nothing less than the fundamental conditions that have to be satisfied for the existence of any 
legal system.”239 
On the other hand, when present in what Kramer considers “a benign regime,” Fuller’s criteria do 
more.  They “become[] expressive of the very ideals which . . . [they] help[] to foster.” 240  Kramer 
explains that the basic features of Fuller’s system “take on the moral estimableness of those ideals, for the 
sustainment of the rule of law in such circumstances is a deliberate manifestation of a society’s adherence 
to liberal-democratic values.”241  His insight is that the role played by such features may alter and expand, 
depending upon the regime.  
Understood in both senses, Fuller’s criteria are compelling.  How could an individual be said to 
have a moral obligation, or a duty, to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret?  Surely this 
could not be the case.  Similarly, how could an individual be required to follow a rule that comes into 
existence after an action is taken?  If law is unintelligible, or contradicted by other rules, it puts the 
individual in an impossible position.  So, too, with laws that constantly fluctuate. 
It is in the importance of consistency in the law, in how it is written and applied, as well as over 
time, that we see the conversation in regard to secrecy advance.  It would make little sense to publicize a 
law, but then to have the law interpreted or applied very differently by those in power, or to have one 
administration interpret (or apply) a law in X way, and the subsequent administration interpret (or apply) 
it as Y.  To the extent that the interpretation or application of the law remains shielded from public view 
and departs from the public meaning of the law, then the seventh and eighth criteria may be implicated.  
The result raises questions about both the existence of law (Kramer’s first category of Fuller’s thought) 
and the morality of the law (Kramer’s second category).  At some point, the existence of such departures 
mean that we no longer have a liberal, democratic state. 
Fuller recognized that secrecy plays an essential role in transforming a society into an autocratic 
structure.  He illustrated his concern by discussing the demise of the Weimar Republic.242  “A situation 
begins to develop,” he wrote, “in which though some laws are published, others, including the most 
important are not.”243  He added, “For the trial of criminal cases concerned with loyalty to the regime, 
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special military tribunals are established.”244  Eventually, “the principal object of government seems to be, 
not that of giving the citizen rules by which to shape his conduct, but to frighten him into impotence.”245 
The Limits of Reason of State 
To the extent that secrecy is tolerated in the liberal, democratic model, it is done so in relation to 
preservation of the state.  National security thus trumps the citizens’ right to know to ensure that the state 
continues to exist.  But even here, there are limits that fall short of accepting secret law. 
The concept of reason of state and the need of the ruler to control information in the interests of 
security and stability has long been part of political discourse.  Epitomized by Niccolò Machiavelli, the 
underlying concept is that certain actions of a ruler can be justified to the extent that they contribute to the 
existence, stability, and well-being of the political structures.246  Not all actions are acceptable, but some 
actions resulting in harm cannot be avoided and must be turned to productive ends.247  
Machiavelli’s consequentialist approach excuses transgressions based on the ends that they 
achieve.248  In the sixteenth century, Giovanni Botero picked up on Machiavelli’s reasoning, defining 
arcana imperii as “knowledge of the means by which such a dominion may be founded, preserved and 
extended.”249  To sustain (and extend) power, discretion and secrecy are paramount.  Like Machiavelli, 
Botero saw the management of information, and its limitation to a small number of individuals, to be 
imperative to political survival. As seventeenth-century legal scholars reimagined Magna Carta, English 
jurists sought to restrict what the Crown could do.  Thus Sir Edward Coke, arguing in Parliament for a 
clause prohibiting arbitrary arrest and search authorities, explained,  
[I]f [imprisonment] be per mandatum domini regis, or “for matter of state”; and then we are gone, 
and we are in a worse case than ever.  If we agree to this imprisonment “for matters of state” and 
“a convenient time,” we shall leave Magna Carta and the other statutes and make them fruitless, 
and do what our ancestors would never do.250 
Ultimately, Parliament, and then the people, became the supreme power, giving democratic institutions 
more authority.251 
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The problem with hearkening back to the Machiavellian tradition and reason of state as sufficient 
to offset public access to the law is grounded in how secrecy functions.  Insofar as deliberative secrecy or 
even certain forms of information secrecy are at stake, the public may forgo immediate knowledge.  But 
secret law undermines the liberal, democratic state.  It is thus a threat as great as, if not even more 
profound than, the national security threats being claimed as justification.  A terrorist organization may 
threaten the life and property of the citizens, but the erection of secret law threatens the very structure of 
government.  It undermines the moral qualities of the law.  And it raises the question of whether and to 
what extent obedience is due.  Ultimately, what is at stake is the rule of law. 
 
4. Adjudicatory Secrecy 
Secrecy in the fourth and final context, Article III adjudication and Article I tribunals, raises 
concerns related to substantive rights, such as liberty, property, privacy, and due process. It evokes 
separation of powers concerns, and it challenges the effective administration of justice. Like secret law, it 
therefore carries with it significant challenges for liberal, democratic governance. 
A. Judicial Proceedings 
Secrecy operates in various ways in the conduct of Article III tribunals. Deliberative secrecy, for 
instance, marks grand jury proceedings. Information secrecy may mark the introduction and use of 
classified information and efforts to prevent judicial opinions from being made public implicate secret 
law. In addition, adjudicatory secrecy may accompany proceedings, with a profound impact on civil and 
criminal litigation.  Spectator exclusion and in camera, ex parte hearings provide two examples. 
In the United States, as in England, criminal trials have long been presumptively open.252  This 
approach was such a fundamental part of criminal adjudication in the United States that in 1948 the 
Supreme Court was “unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any 
federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country.”253  “Nor have we found,” the Court 
continued, “any record of even one such secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of 
Star Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted people secretly is in dispute.”254  The Court 
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attributed the guarantee of public trial to the U.S. English common law heritage, as part of the “ancient 
institution of jury trial.”255 For centuries, English tradition embraced the concept of public trials.  In the 
sixteenth century, Sir Thomas Smith noted the occurrence of public trials in De Republica Anglorum.256  
Sir Matthew Hale in his Historia Placitorum Coronæ discussed public attendance at trial proceedings.257  
As William Blackstone explained, 
This open examination of witnesses viva voce in the presence of all mankind, is much more 
inductive to the clearing up of truth than the private and secret examination taken down in 
writing before an officer or his clerk in the ecclesiastical and all others that have borrowed 
their practice from the civil law.258 
The right of those accused of crime or seeking justice to have a public trial derived from common law.259  
It appeared in the early state constitutions, before its incorporation into the Sixth Amendment.260  
The right to a public trial protects two types of rights: first, the right of the defendant to have the 
proceedings open to public scrutiny; and second, the right of the public to access.261  Multiple 
considerations attach to the defendant’s right.  One relates to pressure on witnesses to tell the truth in 
front of the community—assumedly either because the individual would be shunned, or because there 
might be someone else present who would object based on their knowledge of the facts.262  The public 
also has the potential to keep the judge and jurors in check.263  There is power that comes with 
observation—the flip side of the Panopticon being when the public watches the watchers.  Jeremy 
Bentham explained: 
[S]uppose the proceedings to be completely secret, and the court, on the occasion, to consist of no 
more than a single judge—that judge will be at once indolent and arbitrary; how corrupt soever 
his inclination may be, it will find no check, at any rate no tolerably efficient check, to oppose it.  
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks 
are of small account.  Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might present themselves 
in the character of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in 
reality, as checks only in appearance.264 
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The right of the public, in turn, rests on a number of arguments.  Observation is critical for the democratic 
process.  Without insight into the application of law, voters may remain ignorant as to how officials are 
acting. No less important is this knowledge for participation in the political dialogue.  Citizens in a similar 
position to the defendant also must have access to information that may be of great import to them.  The 
public, in addition, has the right to be a witness to—and to be participant in—the legal system, to see that 
justice is done.  This last consideration may carry an emotive quality stemming from the community’s 
need to see that justice is done. 
Despite the general rule of public access, over time, several exceptions emerged over time for 
limiting access to certain parts of the trial, while still being cognizant of individual and social rights.  By 
the middle of the twentieth century, judges could exclude observers because of space limitations.265  If 
violence threatened the proceedings, the trial judge could take reasonable steps to secure the facilities.266  
Disorderly conduct could lead to members of the public being removed in the middle of a trial.267  And 
where witnesses may be emotionally unable to testify in front of many individuals, the judge could ask 
members of the public to leave to ensure that the witness provided evidence.268   
In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, the Supreme Court further underscored the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments as guarantor of the right of the public and press to attend criminal trials.269  Two 
years later, the Supreme Court ruled a mandatory closure rule designed to protect minors in sexual assault 
cases unconstitutional.270  The fact that criminal trials had traditionally been open to the public mattered, 
not least because such hearings play a significant role in the legal process. 
Technically, a judicial proceeding is held in camera either when spectators are excluded from the 
court room, or when the hearing or discussion takes place with the judge in the privacy of his chambers.  
As the previous section deals with the former type of secrecy, I here consider the second form, with 
further consideration for in limine motions and ex parte hearings, all of which involved secrecy in some 
form or another.  The first two considerations suggest that secrecy can be beneficial to the adjudicative 
process and to achieving a just result.  It is the third type, however, that raises particular concerns in the 
national security arena. 
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In camera hearings can be either on or off the record.  These rules are reflected in administrative 
proceedings.  Confidential business documents, for instance, and testimony made to the International 
Trade Commission that are subject to protective orders, or orders granting in camera treatment, are not 
part of the public record and are retained in a separate in camera record.271  Only those individuals 
identified in the protective order, and court personnel concerned with judicial review, have access to the 
in camera record.272  They are used in various situations, such as in the civil context for testimony related 
to child custody, where a child’s testimony in open court may carry with it a tremendous emotional 
burden, or where issues of confidentiality are of concern.273 Motions in limine are made outside the 
presence of jurors, to request that certain testimony be excluded.  They generally occur before the trial 
begins, with the purpose of preventing certain information from prejudicing the jury against the 
defendant.  These proceedings are secret in that neither the jurors nor the public are not informed of their 
details.  Secrecy here plays a role in protecting the defendant from information that would unfairly bias 
the jury against him or her.  Ex parte matters are generally temporary orders (such as a restraining order 
or temporary custody), pending a formal hearing or an emergency request for a continuance.274  The 
obvious point here is that in such circumstances, it is easier to mislead judges—either intentionally or by 
accident—when there is no one to check the assertions that are being made.  In concert with secret law, 
the impact is felt in statutory interpretation, constitutional understanding, and the ability of society to 
ascertain how the government is wielding its power.  
B. Quasi-Judicial Executive Functions  
Article III courts are not the only entities that engage in adjudicatory processes impacting rights.  
A range of quasi-judicial executive functions weigh evidence of potential wrongdoing and make 
determinations as to guilt or culpability, with a direct impact on legal rights.  The expansion of executive 
activities in this realm coincides with the growth of the administrative state.275  Over the past 70 years, as 
the state has become more focused on national security, secrecy within these administrative tribunals has 
kept pace.  As a result, we now find ourselves in the position in which decisions made by officials impact 
life, liberty, property, privacy, and free speech, with little or no recourse provided for those affected to 
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seek justice in a regular court of law.  An examination of how secrecy functions in these contexts yields 
insight into how secrecy interacts with Constitutional procedural rights.  It also illuminates distinctions 
between citizens and non-citizens and highlights conflicts of interest.  Of no less importance are the 
implications for separation of powers that result from rapidly-expanding executive power.  
Like the concerns that accompany secret law, this category is of concern.  What is at stake is the 
usurpation of the judicial functions of government and thus both separation of powers and substantive 
rights related to life, liberty, property, privacy, and due process of law.  
Targeting 
The number of civilians estimated to have been killed by U.S. drone strikes over the past decade 
is, by some non-governmental accounts, in the thousands.276  Government figures are substantially lower, 
owing perhaps to the assumption that, absent clear evidence to the contrary, all military-age males in a 
strike zone are considered combatants.277  The military and CIA maintain top secret lists of high-value 
targets eligible for kill or capture.278  Some of the factors considered in populating the lists are the 
strength of intelligence indicating enemy status, whether the individual poses an imminent threat, and 
how significant they are in the enemy forces, as well as whether capture is feasible.279 
Decisions to kill or capture enemies are part and parcel of wartime.  But three elements make 
administrative expansion into this realm and the role that secrecy plays different: (a) the indefinite nature 
of the 2001 AUMF as a formal declaration of war (and ambiguity regarding the populations to whom it 
applies); (b) the rapidly-expanding concept of “battlefield”; and (c) the use of kill powers against U.S. 
citizens.  
The 2001 AUMF authorized the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11 
attacks.280  Although not a formal declaration of war, Congress couched the Joint Resolution as specific 
statutory authorization within the meaning of the 1973 War Powers Resolution.281  The language of the 
resolution has been interpreted broadly, to include not only individuals and organizations who are not part 
of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, but also some who are actively hostile to these groups.282  
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Between 2001 and 2016, the President cited his authorities under the AUMF in support of 37 military 
operations in 14 different countries—refusing to specify which groups the statute covered.283  Scholars are 
divided on the legitimacy of the rapidly expanding battlefield.284  Some argue the need take the fight to 
the enemy (wherever the enemy may be located) and respond to human rights concerns by suggesting that 
in a global battlefield, the distinction between war and peace becomes meaningless.  In one of the 
strongest articles on this topic, Professor Jennifer Daskal proposes a set of binding standards to limit (and 
legitimize) the use of targeted killing outside “hot battlefields.”285 
In prosecuting its global war, the government maintains that it can place U.S. citizens on the kill 
or capture list.286  In 2011, for instance, the Central Intelligence Agency killed Anwar al-Awlaki.287  The 
placement of al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, on the top secret targeting list only came to light after a 2014 
Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by the New York Times and the ACLU against the DOJ.288  
Until that point, the records pertaining to the process via which U.S. persons could be designated for 
killing—including who had the authorization to make such determinations and what evidence was 
required to support the designation—was concealed from public view, as were all records pertaining to 
the legal basis of this process in domestic, foreign, and international law.289  
When information regarding al-Awlaki’s placement on the kill list was made public, the 
justification offered was one of public authority:  a well-recognized principle that the government may 
engage in activity that is otherwise forbidden to private citizens.290  What exempted the CIA and DOD 
from the federal murder statute was their use of such force during “the lawful conduct of war.”291  The 
OLC heavily relied on “[h]igh-level government officials” which had concluded, “on the basis of al-
Awlaqi’s activities in Yemen, that al-Awlaqi is a leader of AQAP whose activities in Yemen pose a 
‘continued and imminent threat’ of violence to United States persons and interests.”292  His citizenship did 
not make him immune from the use of force outside U.S. borders.293  The fact that he was located in 
Yemen, and not anywhere near “the most active theater of combat” between the United States and al-
Qaida, also did not matter, as AQAP was, if not part of al-Qaida, a co-belligerent with a strong presence 
in Yemen.294  Because the threat was continued and imminent, and an operation to capture al-Awlaqi 
  47 
infeasible, neither the Fourth Amendment right against seizure nor Fifth Amendment due process rights 
prohibited killing him.295 
The rapidly-expanding concept of war and the battlefield, undergirded by broad Executive 
Branch interpretation of the AUMF, means that targeting, based on secret information only available to 
the executive, becomes the avenue for responding, instead of the state turning to criminal law. In the 
process, the government sidesteps important protections otherwise meant to restrict governmental 
exercise of lethal power.  It is not that in criminal law the execution of citizens never occurs. Capital 
punishment has long been a feature of the U.S. legal system.  But, notably, to the extent that the ability to 
take individuals’ lives exists outside of war, it is subject to lengthy judicial procedures to ensure that 
those who lose their lives are justly tried.  Even then, estimates of the number of wrongful convictions are 
distressingly high.296  Since 1973, there have been 159 people exonerated while on death row—despite 
the procedural protections on capital cases.297  Further rules prevent execution based on age or mental 
capability and limit pain and suffering.  None of these apply to extra-judicial targeting. Added to these 
concerns is the nature of the information on which extra-judicial killings are based and how the fog of war 
obscures what is actually known.  War is notorious for the uncertainty it generates—a situation referred to 
in military terms as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA).  As Clausewitz observed, “war 
is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action is based are wrapped in a fog of 
greater or lesser uncertainty.”298 
The kill list does include specific individuals.  But in 2008, a New York Times article revealed 
further use of signature strikes against unnamed individuals, using location and patterns in behavior as 
evidence of involvement in al Qaida or the Taliban.299  Also known as Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes 
(TADS), signature strikes amount to decisions to kill unidentified individuals.300  That includes 
(potentially) U.S. citizens. In November 2002, for example, human intelligence and signals intelligence 
intercepts suggested that Abu Ali al-Harithi, believed to be involved in the 2002 USS Cole bombing, was 
living in the Marib region of Yemen, near the Saudi Arabia border.301  U.S. forces on the ground were 
monitoring him when they saw two SUVs leave the compound.302  The NSA picked up a call from one of 
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the cars.303  The analyst listening, who had listened numerous times to tapes of al-Harithi, was convinced 
that the person on the phone was not him.304  Overhearing someone in the back seat of the car, he  
immediately identified the background speaker as al-Harithi.305  He called a second analyst over for 
another opinion.306  The phone call lasted all of six seconds, at which point the command was given to fire 
a Hellfire missile at the car, killing all six occupants.307  One of them, Ahmed Hijazi (a.k.a. Kemal 
Derwish), was an American citizen.308  It is unclear whether the CIA knew the identities of the people in 
the car.309  
The incident is instructive in terms of how the secret killing of al-Harithi was carried out.  Some of the 
evidence that al-Harithi was involved in al-Qaida came from Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri—one of three 
detainees the CIA had waterboarded.310  The manner in which the information was obtained raises 
question about its accuracy.  The decision to kill al-Harithi, moreover, depended upon an analyst 
overhearing someone in the background on the phone—a rather attenuated confirmation.  It is not clear 
whether the government knew the identities of the other people it condemned to die in the same attack—
one of whom was an American.  The level of assuredness, while perhaps typical of a battlefield, took 
place hundreds of miles from any active hostilities.  The effect of the secret operation was to cleave the 
judiciary out of the determination of guilt and those Americans killed from any of the procedural 
protections and substantive rights otherwise available to them as a Constitutional matter. 
Liberty Restrictions: Courts martial, military commissions, and immigration 
Another way in which secrecy presents in Article I adjudication relates to restrictions on the 
freedom of movement.  Military tribunals provide a good example.311 Their use is hardly an invention of 
the twenty-first century: the Second Continental Congress recognized a role for military courts in relation 
to certain offenses linked to military order.312  In 1776, the American Articles of War provided for courts-
martial over “[a]ll crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which officers and soldiers may be 
guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.”313 In considering the role of secrecy in 
the conduct of litigation, two forms of military tribunals are of particular import: (i) courts-martial and (ii) 
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military commissions.  In addition, a less formal type of adjudication has existed in regard to (iii) 
detention.  Secrecy plays a unique role in each type of adjudication. 
The modern version of military courts-martial stems from the enactment in 1950 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which establishes three types of proceedings.  The most serious 
offences are tried by general courts-martial, in which a military judge presides, with not less than five 
members (in cases where the penalty is not capital punishment), or twelve members (in capital cases), 
serving as jurors.314  For cases in which the maximum punishment does not exceed twelve months 
imprisonment, a special court martial is constituted of a military judge (or convening authority if a 
military judge cannot be detailed) and three or more members.315  Under certain conditions, and with 
defense agreement, general and special courts martial can be held by a single judge.316  A summary court-
martial deals with the lowest-level offenses and may not be employed if the person on trial objects to 
being tried in such a court.317 
The power of courts-martial is steadily expanding.  Consistent with their traditional position, 
courts-martial have the authority to try current (or former) members of the constituent service for more 
than four dozen offenses laid out in the UCMJ.318  Until the 1987 case of Solorio v. United States, the 
Court required that the offenses be “service-connected,” and not ordinary crimes.319  But in Solorio, the 
Court held that individuals could be tried for any crime incorporated by Congress into the UCMJ—
regardless of whether there was a direct connection to service in the military.320  In the Court’s view, 
Congress had “primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against 
the needs of the military,” which required deference in all situations—including those implicating service 
members’ constitutional rights.321  In 2006, Congress amended the UCMJ to extend courts-martial 
jurisdiction beyond service members and reservists, and individuals subject to the law of war, to include 
“[i]n time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed 
force in the field.”322  In 2012, as Professor Vladeck notes, a lower court controversially held that this 
language applied to noncitizen civilian contractors outside the United States, even though Supreme Court 
doctrine otherwise rejects the application of military law to civilians.323 
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The result, and the associated role that secrecy plays in courts martial, carries implications for: (a) 
which charges are brought (affecting defendant and victim rights);324 (b) the speed of the trial (implicating 
the Eighth Amendment speedy trial provision); (c) the defendant’s ability to mount a defense 
(encroaching on client-attorney privilege as well as the ability of the accused to see, present, or counter 
evidence and witnesses);325 (d) the defendant’s procedural protections (e.g., public access and trial by 
jury);326 and (e) rights of appeal.327  
In November 2001, President Bush announced that military commissions would be established to 
try “certain non-citizens” suspected of involvement in terrorism.328  The military order gave commissions 
jurisdiction over individuals alleged to have committed any offense.  It incorporated a wide range of 
secret information into the trial proceedings, including: 
(i) information classified or classifiable pursuant to [Executive Order 12958]; (ii) 
information protected by law or rule form unauthorized disclosure; (iii) information the 
disclosure of which may endanger the physical safety of participants in Commission 
proceedings, including prospective witnesses; (iv) information concerning intelligence and 
law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; or (v) information concerning other 
national security interests.329 
That definition extended beyond classified documents to include anything considered a threat to U.S. 
national security.  The order authorized the presiding officer (a military judge advocate officer) to take 
steps necessary to protect U.S. interests in regard to state secrets and protected information—including 
deleting information from documents provided to the accused or to defense counsel.330  The presiding 
officer could direct that a summary be provided in lieu of the information or substitute the data with a 
statement of the relevant facts that the sensitive material would tend to establish.331  Further, the presiding 
officer could close any portion of the legal proceedings to prevent sensitive information from being 
disclosed .332  The rules and procedures differed in important other ways from courts-martial or even 
ordinary judicial processes.  Instead of five or twelve members of the U.S. armed forces, panels required 
three military officers.  They also allowed for:  the use of evidence against an accused without providing 
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access to the information; the potential admission of hearsay; the use of unsworn testimony and evidence 
obtained through coercive interrogation; and limited rights of appellate review.333 
The first judicial correction to the overreach came following the February 2004 prosecution of 
Salim Hamdan, a Yemeni national held in Guantánamo Bay, of conspiracy “to commit . . . offenses 
triable by military commission.”334  Hamdan contended that conspiracy was not a violation of the law of 
war and that the procedures instituted for the commissions violated the basic tenets of military and 
international law, “including the principle that a defendant must be permitted to see and hear the evidence 
against him.”335 The Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan’s case that the military commissions could not 
proceed because the structure and procedure violated Article 36 of the UCMJ (which requires uniformity 
of rules with courts-martial, unless uniformity is impracticable) and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
(which prohibits “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.”)336  Because the military commission violated Article 36 of the  
UCMJ, they were not “regularly constituted.”337  Four of the justices further concluded that the offense of 
conspiracy was not an “offens[e] that by . . . the law of war may be tried by military commissions.”338 
Congress responded by passing the 2006 Military Commissions Act, which created a category of 
alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against the U.S. and provided for them to be tried 
by military commission for violations of the law of war, as well as other offences.339  The statute 
established the right of the defendant to see evidence arrayed against him, to be tried before a qualified 
military judge and a panel of members of the U.S. services, to obtain evidence, to cross-examine 
witnesses who testify against him, and to bring witnesses in his or her defense.340  It allowed the 
defendant to seek review of the decision.341  At the same time, it limited the right of habeas corpus.342  It 
narrowed the right to counsel.343  It shifted the burden for hearsay onto the opponent,344 and, while it 
prohibited the use of statements obtained through torture, it did not prohibit the use of statements obtained 
through coercive interrogation.345 Members of the panel cast secret ballots to determine guilt or 
innocence, with only two of the three votes necessary for conviction. 
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In this context, secrecy functioned to allow information to be obtained under conditions that 
significantly departed from judicial norms, undermining not just public perceptions of the tribunals, but, 
as a substantive matter, detainees’ rights.346  The commissions also helped to hide rendition and detention 
from public view, preventing challenge in civilian courts.347  The conversation between the three branches 
continued.   
In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that the 2006 Military Commissions Act unconstitutionally 
suspended detainees’ right to habeas corpus.348  That same year, Hamdan was tried and convicted by a 
six-member military commission and sentenced to 5 ½ years’ confinement for providing material support 
to terrorism.349  Four years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia threw out the 
conviction, in a 3-0 decision, on the grounds that material support did not count as an international war 
crime until the 2006 MCA, at which point Hamdan was in U.S. custody.  Judge Brett Kavanaugh noted, 
“[T]he Executive branch acknowledges that the international law of war did not—and still does not—
identify material support for terrorism as a war crime.” 350  He explained, “If the government wanted to 
charge Hamdan with aiding and abetting terrorism or some other war crime that was sufficiently rooted in 
the international law of war at the time of Hamdan’s conduct, it should have done so.”351  The principle at 
issue was a simple one: can an individual be held liable for conduct that is not criminal at the time it 
occurs?  For centuries, legal jurists have responded to this question with a resounding “no!”  Yet secret 
processes, cloaked from public view, and a hearing hidden from public access, came to a rather different 
answer.  Just three months after the D.C. court’s decision, a panel of the D.C. Circuit came to a similar 
conclusion in regard to charges of conspiracy and solicitation brought against Ali Hamza Ahmad al 
Bahlul.  Remarkably, in October 2016, the en banc court overturned the panel’s decision, upholding his 
conviction on numerous grounds.352   
Congress went on to introduce the 2009 Military Commissions Act, vesting the military 
commissions with jurisdiction over “alien unprivileged enemy belligerents” for  violations of the law of 
war, Articles 104 or 106 of the UCMJ, or any of 32 substantive offences laid out in the MCA.353  It 
prohibited the use of evidence obtained through torture or cruel and unusual punishment, and limiting the 
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conditions under which hearsay evidence can be used.354 The law strengthened the accused’s rights to 
counsel, so that he or she could request a specific counsel from the pool of attorneys and, in capital cases, 
obtain a lawyer with previous experience in the area.  The statute also shifted the burden for the use of 
hearsay evidence to the party intending to use it.355 
The creation of a separate, secret adjudicatory system further raises the risk that in a world in 
which success is determined based on the number of convictions, the executive branch will engage in a 
form of forum shopping, preferencing the systems with greater secrecy and fewer protections for 
defendants, creating a reinforcing mechanism.  In November 2009, for instance, Attorney General Holder 
explained that many of the Guantanamo Bay cases “could be prosecuted in either federal courts or 
military commissions.”356  As counsel for al-Nashiri explained, “the military commission system in 
Guantánamo has become a permanent, civilian-administered adjunct to the judicial system that openly 
competes for the district courts’ jurisdiction over high profile crimes.”357   
 The risks posed by secrecy in Article I tribunals extends beyond the military realm. For decades, 
INS regulations required that deportation proceedings be presumptively open to the public.358  In the 
event that there was not enough space at the facility, the regulations directed that the judge give the media 
priority, to ensure that the proceedings be accessible more broadly.359  Under certain circumstances (to 
protect witnesses, parties, or the public interest) the judge could “limit attendance or hold a closed 
hearing.”360  The regulations required that the proceedings be closed to the public in cases involving abuse 
of an alien spouse and child (unless, in the former case, the spouse agreed to have the proceedings in open 
record).361  The presumption of openness reflected the right to public trial in the criminal realm.362 
Immediately following the attacks of 9/11, the Department of Justice departed from this long-
established practice.  At the direction of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Chief Immigration Judge 
Michael Creppy informed all immigration judges that DOJ had implemented “additional security 
procedures” for cases of “special interest” to the government.363  These hearings would henceforward be 
closed to all members of the public—including family, friends, and the media.364  The Attorney General 
further directed that information regarding the cases neither be posted on the court calendars outside the 
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hearing rooms nor provided in the courts’ telephone services.  Those working at the courthouse were not 
to discuss the cases of special interest with anyone—including indicating whether or not the case had 
been scheduled for a hearing.365  The Record of Proceeding (the official file with documents related to 
non-citizens’ immigration cases) could only be provided to the detainee’s attorney, and then only if it did 
not contain any classified information.366 
The decision to close the existence of the hearings, as well as the hearings themselves, to the 
public was made behind closed doors, without any opportunity for discussion.  The DOJ refused to 
release the criteria for what constituted a case of special interest, and those whose cases fell into this 
category had no opportunity to contest the designation.  Within six months, 611 people were subject to 
secret hearings, approximately two-thirds of whom had been subject to multiple ones.367  Several lawsuits 
challenged the hearings on due process and First Amendment grounds.  In Haddad v. Ashcroft, the 
Eastern District of Michigan considered a case in which an immigration judge had been forced to close 
proceedings to the public, including the family and friends of the individual in custody as well as the 
media.368  The court ruled that the government’s closure violated the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment—a constitutional protection that extends to “all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 
aliens, whether their presence here is unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”369  The court noted the many 
cases in which open hearings have been considered fundamental to concepts of fairness, recognizing that 
the rights at stake in immigration proceedings are at least as serious as those at issue in criminal or civil 
actions, if not more so:.370  In light of the recent attack, it was especially important to ensure open access 
to adjudicative processes: “Few could disagree that the events of September 11 altered the way we view 
our world and the safety of our nation . . . we regard our own neighbors with suspicion and go about our 
day-to-day affairs wary of our own security.”371  The Court continued, “Traditionally, in such a climate, 
individuals (including some in government) are more willing to abridge the constitutional rights of people 
who are perceived to share something in common with the ‘enemy,’ either because of their race, ethnicity, 
or beliefs.”372  At such times, it was particularly important to maintain the country’s commitment to due 
process to ensure that the legal system did not arbitrarily invade the rights of individuals. 
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Other Courts similarly picked up on the importance of open hearings for the rights of the 
defendant.  In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit noted the importance of having 
the public involved to serve “as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial process to public 
scrutiny.”373  The Court also highlighted the importance of spectators to discourage perjury, as well as to 
enhance “the performance of all involved.”374 No less important were open immigration hearings to the 
rights of the public.  In the same case (North Jersey Media Group), the Court emphasized the importance 
of promoting an “informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing the public with the more 
complete understanding of the judicial system.”375  It underscored the importance of promoting “the 
public perception of fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the 
proceedings,” as well as “providing a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for community 
concern, hostility, and emotion.”376 
In May 2002, the DOJ issued an interim rule, allowing immigration judges to decide which 
hearings to close on a case-by-case basis.377  The order expanded the regulations to allow judges to issue 
protective orders and to accept documents under seal, to “ensure that sensitive law enforcement or 
national security information can be protected against general disclosure, while still affording full use of 
the information.”378  Some of the reasons given for needing the provision were strong, such as the concern 
that revealing the identity of witnesses might allow terrorists to threaten the witnesses or their families, 
with the result that witnesses would not, in the future, be willing to come forward.  But other arguments, 
such as the need to protect the rules governing law enforcement investigations were particularly 
concerning, considering their spill over affect on the criminal justice system. 
Property rights 
Other quasi-judicial processes carried out by the executive, such as rules concerning asset 
freezing and forfeiture, deprive targets of their property.  Like targeting and liberty restrictions, secrecy 
permeates the structures, giving rise to similar concerns about the invasion of substantive rights.  
Consider, for instance, Executive Order 13224, under which the President can place sanctions on 
individuals.  This power originated from legislation issued by Congress to give the President the 
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flexibility to respond to foreign state threats.  During the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson 
established an Office of Alien Property Custodian under the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act.379  The 
statute authorizes the President to appoint an individual as Alien Property Custodian (APC) to “receive . . 
. hold . . . administer . . . and account for” “all money and property in the United States due or belonging 
to an enemy, or ally of enemy.”380  That office had the authority to seize, to administer, and (under certain 
conditions) to sell property held by anyone deemed to be a threat to the war effort.  Wilson appointed A. 
Mitchell Palmer to head the office.  Within a year, the office had amassed hundreds of millions of dollars 
in private property.381  During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt re-constituted the office, 
conferring powers from TWEA, as well as the First War Powers Act, 1941, on the APC.382  “Any 
property, or interest therein, of any foreign country or a national thereof shall vest in the Alien Property 
Custodian whenever the Alien Property Custodian shall so direct.”383 
Following abuses of the power by the Nixon Administration, Congress withdrew TWEA and 
replaced it with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.384  This law focused on threats 
outside the country.  Once a national emergency is declared, the President can designate entities 
considered a threat to national security, freezing their assets and blocking any trade between them and 
U.S. persons.385  The President informs Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which 
informs banks.  The statute includes a criminal penalty for those who refuse to comply.  At first, 
successive administrations only applied IEEPA to states.  But in the 1990s, President Clinton extended it 
to include nonstate actors: specifically, Palestinian organizations and the Cali drug cartel.  In January 
1995, for the first time, he extended it to individuals (those threatening to disrupt the Middle East peace 
processes), and he forbade transferring any funds, goods, or services to them.386  The annex to the order 
included a “Specially Designated Terrorist” list, on which a dozen organizations and eighteen individuals 
had been placed.387  In 1998, following the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 
Osama bin Laden and a number of his key aides joined them on the SDT list.388 
Following 9/11, President Bush issued a new executive order under the IEEPA, establishing a 
new “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT) list.389  The order blocked “all property and 
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interests in property” of individuals listed, as well as all persons determined “to assist in, sponsor, or 
provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, 
such acts of terrorism or those persons listed in the Annex.”390  As a practical matter, this means that 
entities who continue to do business with individuals listed in the order can have their assets frozen.  
The process of listing individuals is highly secretive and takes place entirely within the executive 
branch.  Efforts to challenge such designations have been met with refusal by the Courts to get involved.  
What makes these procedures remarkable is that they end up directly impacting the same rights that are 
normally addressed through ordinary judicial procedures.  The effect is felt both in terms of rights and in 
diminishing the role of the judiciary.  Even when cases end up in Court, the willingness of the judiciary to 
look too deeply into why individuals have had their assets frozen turns out to be extremely limited.  This 
is true even in regard to material support provisions, where criminal penalties are applied.391  The 
executive exercises secretive adjudicatory powers that directly impact property rights in numerous other 
areas, with a similar potential impact on substantive and procedural rights.392  
 
Conclusion 
It is not enough to ask how secrecy presents obstacles to civil and criminal litigation.  First, one 
must ask how secrecy functions and then determine whether it is beneficial or harmful to the liberal, 
democratic state.  Accordingly, this chapter has focused on four areas: deliberation, information, law, and 
adjudication.  The first of these, deliberative secrecy. may result in better policies and laws and fairer 
administration of justice.  Far from having a deleterious effect, it may be a necessary condition of 
reaching the optimal outcome.  The central question is at what point the deliberation approaches a final 
decision.  To the extent that the deliberative process as it approaches this point is probative of the 
meaning of the law, rule, or policy adopted, then the information is important to have in the public 
domain.  The real question is the point at which the type of secrecy at issue alters to information secrecy 
or to secret law, at which point different considerations come into play.  The second area, information 
secrecy, carries with it the benefit of protecting against vulnerabilities.  But taken too far, it may prevent 
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individuals wronged from being able to seek justice in either the civil or the criminal realm.  Further 
damage may be done to the ability of the public to know what officials are doing and therefore to hold 
them accountable for their acts.  Of the four types of secrecy discussed in this chapter, the third, secret 
law, gives rise to the greatest concern.  Static law generated by Congress, working law introduced by the 
executive, and interpretive law offered by the courts all come within this domain.  For the latter, secret 
opinions raise significant concerns related to statutory construction, constitutional interpretation, and 
accountability.  For all three categories, the issues are even more profound: secrecy challenges the 
morality of the law, casting further doubt on whether law properly could be said to exist at all.  It 
undermines the legitimacy of the government.  Claims of reason of state are insufficient in that the “state” 
which is being claimed no longer reflects the most basic principles of liberal democracy. 
To the extent that secrecy acts within adjudicatory processes, the greatest impact is felt in the 
administration of justice.  In the judicial realm, cases may be prevented from proceeding.  Public 
exclusion may relieve pressure on the prosecution to mount a strong case and undermine the 
defendant’s—as well as the public’s—right to an open trial.  Secretive adjudication in the executive 
branch undermines both individual rights and separation of powers.  Along with secret law, adjudicatory 
secrecy raises some of the most profound challenges to the liberal, democratic state.  Both types of 
secrecy reach into the legitimacy of the law and erode its morality in ways that have profound 
consequences for the structure of the state. 
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executive privilege operative in secrecy, as against Congressional power.  Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated 
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PGWCon, 5:219 (providing a broad overview of the discussions to his brother).  See JOHN R. VILE, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 694 (“George Washington filled his diaries during his time with records of 
the weather and where he dined, but he included no substantive facts about the Convention.  Delegates frequently 
cited the secrecy rule in corresponding with their friends.  James Madison, the individual who kept the most 
extensive and accurate notes of Convention proceedings, was the last delegate who attended the Convention to die, 
and he specified that his notes would not be published until after his death.”); TONY WILLIAMS & STEPHEN F. 
KNOTT, WASHINGTON AND HAMILTON:  THE ALLIANCE THAT FORGED AMERICA 104-127 (2016); RICHARD 
BEEMAN, PLAIN HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 83-84 (2009). 
15 James Madison to James Monroe, June 10, 1787 (“One of the earliest rules established by the Convention 
restrained the members from any disclosure whatever of its proceedings, a restraint which will not probably be 
removed for some time.  I think the rule was a prudent one not only as it will effectually secure the requisite freedom 
of discussion, but as it will effectually secure the requisite freedom of discussion, but as it will save both the 
Convention and the Community from a thousand erroneous and perhaps mischievous reports.”). 
  60 
 
16 Articles of Confederation, Article XII (“Nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; 
unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the 
legislatures of every State.”). 
17 George Mason to George Mason, Jr., June 1, 1787. 
18 Farrand III, 479. 
19 U.S. CONST., Art. I, §5 “(Each house shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings and from time to time publish the 
same, excepting such Parts as may in their judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of 
either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.”). 
20 It was not until 1913 that the Seventeenth Amendment required the direct election of senators.  Prior to that, state 
legislatures played a central role. 
21 U.S. CONST., Art. I(7).  See also JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST 58 (extolling the House as holding “power 
over the purse”); THE FEDERALIST 52 (noting their shorter election and the House of Representatives’ “duty to the 
people”). 
22 U.S. Senate, The Senate Opens its Doors, Dec. 9, 1795, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/The_Senate_Opens_Its_Doors.htm. 
23 Id. 
24 Clive Parry, Legislatures and Secrecy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 737, 743 (1954). 
25 Annals of Congress, Senate, 3rd Cong., 1st Sess, p. 33 (Jan. 16, 1794). 
26 Id. at 33-34. 
27 Id. at 34. 
28 Id. 
29 See also Annals of Congress, Jan. 17, 1794 at 34 (extending consideration of the Resolution until the following 
Wednesday); Annals of Congress, Jan. 22, 1974 at 37 (extending consideration of the Resolution for a fortnight); 
Annals of Congress, Feb. 5, 1794 at 40 (extending consideration of the Resolution for a fortnight); Annals of 
Congress, Feb. 19, 1794 at 45-46 (voting to take up the main question in the next session of Congress). 
30 Annals of Congress, Feb. 11, 1794 at 42-43 (Resolving “That the doors of the Senate be opened, and continue 
open during the discussion upon the contested election of Albert Gallatin.”). 
31 Annals of Congress, Feb. 20, 1794, at 47.  The resolution, which passed 19-8, went into effect after the end of the 
First Session “and so soon as suitable galleries shall be provided for the Senate Chamber.”  Id. 
32 U.S. CONST., Art. I, §9 (“[A] regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money 
shall be published from time to time.”). 
33 Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 241, 254 (2015). 
34 Id., at 255. 
35 House of Representatives, Rule XVII (9). 
36 See, e.g., Dec. 27, 1825 (relations with Indian tribes); May 27, 1830 (trade with Great Britain); June 20, 1979 (the 
Panama Canal); Feb. 25, 1980 (Cuban foreign relations); July 19, 1983 (U.S. relations with paramilitaries in 
Nicaragua); and March 13, 2008 (FISA).  
37 Standing Senate Rules XXI, XXIX, and XXXI. 
38 Senate Rules for Impeachment Trials, Rules XX and XXIV. 
39 See, e.g., impeachment proceedings (May 24, 1933; Apr. 15-16 1936; Oct. 7-9 1986; Mar. 16, 1989; Oct. 19, 
1989; Nov. 2, 1989; Jan. 25-26 1999; and Dec. 7, 2010); foreign affairs matters include Jun. 7, 1971 (U.S. 
involvement in Laos); Feb. 21-22, 1978 (Panama Canal); Apr. 26, 1983 (U.S. support for Contras); Feb. 1, 1984 
(U.S.S.R. arms control compliance); Feb. 25, 1992 (MFN extension to China); Apr. 24, 1997 (Chemical Weapons 
Convention); Dec. 20, 2010 (New Start Treaty). 
40 Number ascertained from SSCI website.  Note that for SSCI, the closed hearings include briefings by members of 
the Administration. 
41 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/. 
42 In 2016, HPSCI held more than twice as many closed hearings as open ones (with nine hearings closed and four 
open).  U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
https://intelligence.house.gov/calendar/default.aspx?EventTypeID=215&Page=2.  In 2017, it again held nine closed 
hearings with just six hearings open to the public.  Id. 
43 In 2017, outside of the nominations process, the committee held nine closed sessions and 30 open ones; in 2018, 
there were seven closed hearings and 17 open ones.  U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings?PageNum_rs=1&c=115&type=full. 
44 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
  61 
 
45 It appears that Wagner informed Jefferson about the commissions, prompting the President to remove acting 
Secretary of State John Marshall and appoint Levi Lincoln in his place. 
465 U.S. 1 Cranch 143 (1803) (“Mr. Lincoln, attorney general, having been summoned and now called, objected to 
answering. . . . On the one hand he respected the jurisdiction of this court, and on the other he felt himself bound to 
maintain the rights of the executive.  He was acting as secretary of state at the time when this transaction happened.  
He was of opinion, and his opinion was supported by that of others whom he highly respected, that he was not 
bound, and ought not to answer, as to any facts which came officially to his knowledge while acting as secretary of 
state.”). 
47 5 U.S. 1 Cranch, 144 (1803). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  He was not required to answer anything that might incriminate himself, as protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
52 Id. 
53 5 U.S. 1 Cranch, 144-145 (1803) (“If there had been he was not obliged to answer it; and if he thought that any 
thing was communicated to him in confidence he was not bound to disclose it; nor was he obliged to state any thing 
which would criminate himself; but that the fact whether such commissions had been in the office or not, could not 
be a confidential fact; it is a fact which all the world have a right to know.”) 
54 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 145 (1803). 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (recognizing the President’s generalized interest in 
confidentiality); N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (stating as the ultimate purpose of 
executive privilege ensuring the highest-quality agency decisions); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
56 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. Of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
57 See 5 U.S.C.A. §552(b)(5); Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. 1 (2001); F.T.C. v. Grolier Inc., 
462 U.S. 19 (1983); NRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154 (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 1497, p. 10; S. Rep. 
No. 813, p. 2. 
58 532 U.S. 1. 
59 See, e.g., U.S. v. Weber Aircraft Corp, 465 U.S. 792 (1984). 
60 Fed. R. Crim. Pro. Rule 6(e)(2)(B).  Exceptions are laid out in Rule 6(e)(3)(A)-(G). 
61 Rule 6(e)(3)(A). 
62 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. 706(2)(A); 16 U.S.C.A. 1855(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Oceana, Inc. v. Ross, 920 F.3d 855 
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 2019). 
63 See discussion, infra, Part 3. 
64 Act of July 1, 1790, ch. 22 Stat. 128, vol. 1, at 128. 
65 Act of July 1, 1790, ch. 22 Stat. 128, vol. 1, at 128, §1. 
66 Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 299, vol. 2, at 299, 2 An Act to continue in force for a limited time, and to 
amend the act intituled, “An act providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.”  
The Third Congress made an additional $1 million available to the President “to defray any expenses which may be 
incurred, in relation to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.”  Act of Mar. 20, 1794, ch. 7, 
1 Stat. 345, An act making further provisions for the expenses attending the intercourse of the United States with 
foreign nations; and further to continue in force the act entitled “An act providing the means of intercourse between 
the United States and foreign nations.”, p. 345, §1.  The law required that an account of the expenditures be laid 
before Congress.  
67 Exec. Order 8381, Mar. 22, 1940. 
68 Exec. Order 8381 (Mar. 22, 1940) (Roosevelt); Exec. Order 10104 (Feb. 1, 1950) (Truman); Exec. Order 10290 
(Sept. 24, 1951) (Truman); Exec. Order 10501 (Dec. 15, 1953) (Eisenhower); Exec. Order 10964 (1961) 
(Kennedy)(amending Exec. Order 10501); Exec. Order 11652 (Mar. 8, 1972) (Nixon); Exec. Order 12065 (June 28, 
1978) (Carter); Exec. Order 12356 (Apr. 2, 1982) (Reagan); Exec. Order 12958 (Apr. 17, 1995) (Clinton); Exec. 
Order 13292 (Bush) (Amending Exec. Order 12958); Exec. Order 13526 (Dec. 29, 2009) (Obama).  Note that 
various other orders play a subsidiary role.  See, e.g., Exec. Order 12829, as amended (National Industrial Security 
Program); Exec. Order 13549 (Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and 
Private Sector Entities); Exec. Order 13556 (Nov. 4, 2010) (Controlled Unclassified Information); Exec. Order 
13587 (Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and 
Safeguarding of Classified Information). 
69 Exec. Order 13256, §1.4. 
  62 
 
70 The IC includes two independent agencies (the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central 
Intelligence Agency), eight Department of Defense elements (the Defense Intelligence Agency, the NSA, the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and each of the services’ intelligence 
components—the Army, Navy, Air force, and Marine Corps), and seven additional departments and agencies (the 
Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis and U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of 
State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis).  Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Members of the IC, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-
we-do/members-of-the-ic. 
71 ISOO 2016 Report, p. 1, https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/reports/2016-annual-report.pdf. 
72 See, e.g., Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. POST (July 19, 
2010), http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/; 
Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Miniscule for All-consuming N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2013); etc.  But note that part 
of the reason for this broad use of classification relates to the expansion in the types of activities conducted by the 
intelligence agencies since 9/11 and the correspondingly large number of employees and extensive resources being 
made available.  Simultaneously, the proliferation of new technologies allows for the rapid replication and derivative 
classification of data. 
73 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. 79-585, codified as amended at 60 Stat. 755, Aug. 1, 1946; Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, Pub. L. 83-703, codified as amended at 68 Stat. 919, Aug. 30, 1954. 
74 AEA 1954, §11(y). See also Exec. Order 13526, §6.2(a) (acknowledging RD). 
75 The alteration gave DOD a role in FRD declassification and allowed military personnel to access nuclear 
information with DOD clearances.  It also made it possible for industry to develop nuclear power. 
76 Exec. Order 13,556, Nov. 4, 2010 (Controlled Unclassified Information).  See also 32 CFR part 2002.  SBU 
incorporated designations such as For Official Use Only (FOUO), Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES), and Critical 
Infrastructure Information (CII), which proliferated following the 9/11 attacks.  
77 CUI applies to certain, approved categories and subcategories of information established by ISOO.  The executive 
branch provides general descriptions for each category, a basis for controls, special markings, and guidance on 
training and handling procedures.  See, e.g., Assessing Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified 
Information, NIST Special Publication 800-171A, June 2018; Information Security Oversight Office, Controlled 
Unclassified Information: Implementation & Recommendations, Oct. 2017, at 4. 
78 Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, codified at 18 U.S.C. Appendix §§1-16. 
79 Foreign Intelligence Surveilance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, §702. 
80 Paul C. Light, The True Size of Government, Issue Paper, THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE, 2017, 
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Issue%20Paper_True%20Size%20of%20Governmen
t.pdf. 
81 Id. 
82 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. United States, 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985) (Dismissal of a libel action brought following 
publication of an article in Penthouse Magazine on the Pentagon and CIA’s use of animals for military and 
intelligence purposes.  The U.S. Navy moved to intervene on the grounds that the case risked exposing classified 
information.); Bareford v. General Dynamics Corporation, 973 F.2d 1138 (1992) (dismissing a case brought against 
a contractor claiming a manufacturing and design defect in relation to the Phalanx weapons system); Crater Corp. v. 
Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (government intervening and invoking the state secrets privilege 
over 26,000 documents); United States ex. Rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc, 211 F.R.D. 388 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (suit over 
wrongful termination dismissed after the government intervened to assert state secrets). 
83 Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77-216 (2010). 
84 See Georgetown Law State Secrets Archive, maintained by Laura K. Donohue and the Georgetown Law Center 
on National Security and the Law, http://apps.law.georgetown.edu/state-secrets-archive/ (visited May 22, 2019). 
85 Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77-216 (2010). In the criminal context as 
well, Executive branch claims of secrecy have prevailed. Id. 
86 Id. 
87 In Restis v. United Against Nuclear Iran, for instance, a Greek citizen, Victor Restis, who owns and manages 
Enterprises Shipping and Trading, complained that United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and its CEO Mark Wallace 
(a former representative of the U.S Mission to the United Nations) had engaged in defamation and various other 
torts. Victor Restis v. American Coalition against Nuclear Iran, Case No. 13-cv-5032 (2013), Amended Complaint 
for Defamation and other Tort Claims, ¶1, ¶3; ¶103 ff (defamation), ¶112 ff (tortious interference with prospective 
  63 
 
economic advantage); ¶119 ff (tortious interference with contract); ¶125 ff (intentional infliction of emotional 
distress); ¶132 ff (negligent interference with prospective economic advantage); ¶138 ff (prima facie tort against all 
defendants). He accused them of using press releases, letters to government officials, advertisements, Facebook 
postings, and Tweets to prevent private entities from providing support to Iran. Victor Restis v. American Coalition 
against Nuclear Iran, Case No. 13-cv-5032 (2013), Amended Complaint for Defamation and other Tort Claims, ¶4; 
¶6. It did not specify the nature of the information at stake, contending that neither could any information related to 
the suit safely be made public, nor could Plaintiffs’ counsel be given access (e.g., through a CIPA-like clearance 
procedure). Govt. Opp. Mem. L. 2. In March 2015, the court dismissed the suit, with the result that the government 
never had to account for the accusations against it. Restis v. United Against Nuclear Iran, 1:13-cv-05032 (Mar. 23, 
2015) (2d Cir.) 
88 S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. § 8(a), (b)(1)-(5) (1976); Rules of House of Representatives, 115th Cong., Rule X(g)(1) 
(2017). 
89 S. Res. 400 §10. 
90 SSCI R.P., 115th Cong., Rules 8.10, 9.5, 9.7; S. Res. 400, § 8(a). 
91 HPSCI R.P., 115th Cong., Rules 12(a)-(b), 14. 
92 Id. at Rule 13 (labelling it “executive session material”). 
93 Id. at Rule 14(d), (f), (g), (i), (l); House Rule X(11)(g). 
94 Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, Pub. L. 82-256, 66 Stat. 3, Feb. 1, 1952, 35 U.S.C. §181. 
95 Hornback v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 552, 554 (1996). 
96 Weiss v. United States, 146 F.Supp.3d 113, 127 (D. Mass. 2001), aff’d, 37 F.App’x. 518 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
97 Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239, 244 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 663, 
665 (1980). 
98 Invention Secrecy Activity as reported by the Patent & Trademark Office, Federation of American Scientists, at 
https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/stats.html. 
99 Id. The intervening years saw an increase to 5,445 in 2013 and 5,520 in 2014. Id. 
100 Invention Secrecy Activity as Reported by the Patent & Trademark Office FY 05-FY18, 
https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2018/10/invention-secrecy-2018/.  
101 Steven Aftergood, Secrecy News: Invention Secrecy Increased in 2016, Federation of American Scientists (Oct. 
31, 2016), https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2016/10/invention-secrecy-2016/. 
102 But see Hornback v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 552, 554 (1996); Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239, 244 
(Ct. Cl. 1980) [hereinafter “Constant I”]; Lear Siegler, Inc. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 663, 665 (1980); 
Damnajanovic et al. v. U.S. Department of the Air Force, EDMI, civ No 14-11920 (2015); Constant v. United 
States, 617 F.2d 239, 244 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Hornback v. United States, 16 F.3d 422 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hornback v. 
United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 1, 3 (2004) aff’d, 405 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Lear Sigler, Inc. v. United States, 225 Ct. 
Cl. 663 (1980). 
103 Constant I, 223 Ct. Cl. 148; Constant v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 600 (1982) [hereinafter “Constant II”]. See also 
Linick v. United States, citing to Constant I and II. 
104 Constant I.  
105 See, e.g., Lear Siegler, Inc. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 663 (1980); Weiss, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 126-127; Linick 
106 See, e.g., Weiss v. U.S., 37 Fed. Appx. 518 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (insufficient evidence for damages because of failure 
to file patent applications in foreign countries); Haynes v. U.S., 178 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (insufficient 
evidence for damages because of failure to demonstrate potential or existing market); Linick v. U.S., 104 Fed. Cl. 
319, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2012), summarily aff’d, 2013 WL 2991418 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (trajectory correctible 
munitions patent holder failed to show technology was of real interest to any customer, despite the government 
having imposed secrecy orders on three patent applications); Constant v. U.S., 1 Cl. Ct. 600, 216 U.S.P.Q. 505 
(1982), judgment summarily aff’d, 714 F.2d 162 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (insufficient evidence of actual damages when 
patent application placed under an order for 15 months and patentee prohibited from discussing the invention with 
certain classes of people); Lear Siegler, Inc., Electronic Instrumentation Division, 225 Ct. Cl. 663, 214 U.S.P.Q. 
239, 1980 WL 13202 (1980) (insufficient proof of injury and damages). But see Damnjanovic v. United States 
Department of Air Force, 135 F.Supp. 3d 601 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (successful claim that inventors were unable to sell 
or market their invention, that they lost profits and were prohibited from foreign filing rights, and that the 
government failed to provide compensation). 
107 Farrand Optical Co. v. U.S., 325 F.2d 328, 139 U.S.P.Q. 249 (2d Cir. 1963) (stating damages only as flow 
directly from secrecy order); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S., 229 Ct. Cl. 323, 670 F.2d 156, 214 U.S.P.Q. 857, 
29 Cont. Cas. Fed (CCH) ¶82178 (1982) (holding two alternatives for damages: improper use, and damage caused 
by secrecy order). 
  64 
 
108 Farrand Optical Co. v. U.S., 325 F.2d 328, 139 U.S.P.Q. 249 (2d Cir. 1963); Haynes v. U.S., 178 F.3d 1307 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
109 Heinemann v. U.S., 223 Ct. Cl. 479, 620 F.2d 874, 206 U.S.P.Q. 418, 27 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) ¶80357 (1980). 
110 See, e.g., E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 594, 1979 WL 25067 (N.D. Iowa 
(1979), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 620 F.2d 1247, 205 U.S. P.Q. 1, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶63214, 65 A.L.R. 
Fed. 369 (8th Cir. 1980); Constant v. U.S., 1 Cl. Ct. 600, 216 U.S.P.Q. 505 (1982). 
111 Damnajanovic et al, v. U.S. Department of the Air Force, EDMI, civ No 14-11920 (2014) (regarding secrecy 
order placed on U.S. Patent Application No. 11/881,492). 
112 Countermeasure Technique Using an Appropriate Fluid Spray Against Infrared Heat Seeking Missile, US 
8925438 B1 (filed Jan. 6, 2007, granted Jan. 6, 2015). 
113 Suitability and Security Processes Review, Report to the President, Feb. 2014, 
https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/omb/suitsec-2014.pdf.  The National Industrial Security Program controls the conditions 
under which contractors obtain security clearances for more than two dozen federal agencies. Exec. Order 12829; 
Jan. 6, 1993 (National Industrial Security Program). 
114 The argument for the latter is that without an agreement in place, each agency would need to seek to enjoin 
publication.  See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (CA4), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); United 
States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
115 18 U.S.C. §798. 
116 18 U.S.C. §793-4. 
117 18 U.S.C. §§795-7. 
118 See, e.g., The Constitution Project, The Report of the Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment 
(2013) (drew on IC employee accounts of detainee mistreatment). 
119 See, e.g., Chris McGreal, Dick Cheney Defends Use of Torture on Al-Qaida Leaders, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 9, 
2011. 
120 See, e.g., Mark Mansfield, Reflections on Service: A Conversation with Former CIA Director Michael Hayden, 
Stud. Intelligence, June 2010, at 63, 65-66 (“[W]hatever you may think of this, it worked and we did indeed get life-
saving intelligence out of it.”); John Rizzo, CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation “Necessary and Effective,” Frontline 
(Sept. 13, 2011) (“necessary and effective”). 
121 Kevin Casey, Note, Till Death do us Part: Prepublication Review in the Intelligence Community, 115 COLUM. L 
REV. 417, 445-449 (2015) (“The experiences of authors undergoing prepublication review suggest that review 
decisions may depend on whether the author is critical or supportive of the agency.”). 
122 Id. 
123 Karl Marx, The Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State, in EARLY WRITINGS 107 (1974). 
124 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181 (1976). 
125 Id. 
126 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, Vol. 1. 
127 Yet this appears to be what the government did in relation to Professor Jack Goldsmith’s book, The Terror 
Presidency. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Oona Hathaway, More Problems with Prepublication, LAWFARE, Dec. 28, 
2015, https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-problems-prepublication-review (reporting that they had been required to 
append a statement to an op-ed in which no classified information appeared that the publication did not reflect 
official DOD policy). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Add cites: Diane Feinstein statement to Congress; IG Report later noting false choices. 
131 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (“Any system of prior restraints of expression 
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’” (quoting Bantam Books, Inc v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
132 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
133 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
134 Jack Goldsmith & Oona Hathaway, The Government’s Prepublication Review Process is Broken, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 25, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-governments-prepublication-review-process-is-
broken/2015/12/25/edd943a8-a349-11e5-b53d-972e2751f433_story.html?utm_term=.f7e247f74701.  The scholars 
both served as special counsel to the General Counsel at the Department of Defense.  Goldsmith also served as the 
Director of the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice. 
135 Id. See also Jack Goldsmith & Oona Hathaway, More Problems with Prepublication, LAWFARE, Dec. 28, 2015, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-problems-prepublication-review. 
  65 
 
136 United States v. Marchetti 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
140 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck & James J. Eisen, Balancing National Security and Free Speech, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 339 (1982); Jonathan C. Medow, The First Amendment and the Secrecy State:  Snepp v. United States, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 775 (1982); Diane F. Orentlicher, Comment, Snepp v. United States; The CIA Secrecy 
Agreement and the First Amendment, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 662 (1981). 
141 National Security Directive No. 84 (Mar. 11, 1983)(“(a) All persons with authorized access to classified 
information shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access.  (b) All persons with 
authorized access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) shall be required to sign a nondisclosure 
agreement as a condition of access to SCI and other classified information.   All such agreements must include a 
provision for prepublication review to assure deletion of SCI and other classified information.”). 
142 See Louis Fisher, Congressional-Executive Struggles over Information: Secrecy Pledges, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 89 
(1990) [NB: check Congressional hearings held by Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs over 
constitutionality of directive]. 
143 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, No. GAO/NSIAD-91-106FS, Information Security:  Federal Agency Use of 
Nondisclosure Agreements 10 (Jan. 1991), http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/89057.pdf. 
144 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, No. GAO/T-NSIAD-88-44, Classified Information Nondisclosure 
Agreements: Statement of Louis J. Rodrigues, Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs 
Division, Before the Subcommittee on Legislation and International Security, Committee on Government 
Operations, U.S. House of Representatives 3 (1988). 
145 Kevin Casey, Note, Till Death do us Part: Prepublication Review in the Intelligence Community, 115 COLUM. L 
REV. 417, 429-430 (2015). 
146 Dina Temple-Raston, In ‘the Black Banners,’ Ali Soufan Takes Readers Inside the Interrogation Room, Wash. 
Post, Oct. 28, 2011 (noting different perspective); Jessie Stern. 
147 Professor Rudesill defines secret law as follows: “legal authorities that require compliance that are classified or 
otherwise withheld from the public.”  Dakota Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 
241, 249 (2015).  Although he includes within his definition executive and judicial interpretations that serve as 
precedent or are in other respects binding legal constructions, I distinguish among the phenomena by function.  
Other scholars have defined the term in different ways.  See, e.g., HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: 
TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 85-87 (defining secret law as “when the executive 
deems it necessary to the national interest not only to circumvent a statute, but to do so in secret).  
148 Three different types of committee, three separate annual bills, and multiple kinds of legislative materials are 
involved. Congressional practice, moreover, peregrinates. The bottom line is that as of fiscal year 1979, the IAA had 
both public law provisions and classified addenda; since the same year, the DODAAs have had just classified 
addenda,; and from fiscal year 1983 the NDAAs had classified addenda. Starting in 1990-91, both the DODAA and 
NDAAs started incorporating Public Law provisions giving the addenda legal force.  
149 Rudesill, at 261. 
150 Id. See, e.g., Intelligence Authorization Act of 2016, Sec. 102, Classified Schedule of Authorizations. 
151 Id. 
152 See S. 3159 (115th): Department of Defense Appropriations Act (2019). See also CRS Report, FY 2019 Defense 
Appropriations Act (Apr. 12, 2019). 
153 Id., at 262. 
154 Id., at 373-74. 
155 Id. 
156 Further reports, such as joint explanatory statements, may be appended to a bill, prior to the President’s signature. 
Nevertheless, the President signs the bill—not the additional documents, which may not be available to the President 
at presentment. Id., at 263-64.  
157 Id., at 267-68 (Citing to statements in 2015 by the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence that the classified schedules to the IAA 102 provisions ae considered by the intelligence community to 
be law). 
158 Id., at 276. 
159 Id. 
160 Id., at 273-274. 
  66 
 
161 But note that Rudesill argues that if statutory text means not what particular committees think it means, but rather 
what the common understanding is, then the classified documents cannot have interpretive relevance. Id., at 264. 
162 Some effort has been made within the Executive branch to halt the practice of using classified annexes. The 
Office of Management and Budget objected to “the continuing Congressional practice of enacting secret law.” Id., 
citing Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 
Exec Office of the President, to Dianne Feinstein, Chairwoman, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Regarding S. 1494 And H.R. 2701, The Intelligence Acts For Fiscal Year 2010 (March 15, 2010), at 6, 
https://fas.org/irp/news/2010/03/ omb031610.pdf; Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 2586, National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget (Sept. 24, 2001), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?pid=25591. 
163 Id., at 277. For updates to the 2015 study see Dakota S. Rudesill, Tracking Congress’s Library of Secret Law: 
Legislative Update for the 114th and 115th Congresses, LAWFARE, June 29, 2017, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tracking-congresss-library-secret-law-legislative-update-114th-and-115th-congresses 
(noting the continued high rate of enactment of Public Law provisions giving legal force to classified addenda).  
164 Appropriations for electronic warfare, missile defense, and military operations in Iraq also fall within classified 
annexes. Id., at 277-278. 
165 Id., at 279, citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-367, at 20 (1989). 
166 See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (referring to “working law”). 
167 Some other examples include agency opinions, administrative adjudications, targeting and minimization 
guidelines, DOD directives, etc. 
168 44 U.S.C. §1505a(1). 
169 44 U.S.C. §1505a(2)-(3). 
170 44 U.S.C. §1505a. 
171 44 U.S.C. §1505c. 
172 44 U.S.C. §1505c. 
173For a good discussion of Presidential Directives, see Harold C. Relyea, Presidential Directives: Background and 
Overview, CRS Report for Congress, Nov. 26, 2008, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-611.pdf. 
174 Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to the Counsel to the President, Legal 
Effectiveness of a Presidential Directive, as Compared to an Executive Order, Jan. 29, 2000, 
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/predirective.html (“A presidential directive has the same substantive legal effect as an 
executive order.  It is the substance of the presidential action that is determinative, not the form of the document 
conveying that action.  Both an executive order and a presidential directive remain effective upon a change in 
administration, unless otherwise specified in the document, and both continue to be effective until subsequent 
presidential action is taken.”). 
175 President Obama, for instance, used Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs) as decision directives and Presidential 
Study Directives (PSDs) for reviews.  President George H. W. Bush, in contrast, used National Security Directives 
(NSDs) for the former and National Security Reviews (NSRs) for the latter. 
176 For a full list of presidential memoranda see Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, Federation of 
American Scientists, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm. 
177 NSPD 7, Oct. 4, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/national-security-presidential-
memorandum-7/. 
178 See Trevor Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1448 (2010). 
Numerous individuals who have served in OLC have noted that OLC opinions are binding. See, e.g., Marty 
Lederman; Jack Goldsmith; Karl Thompson, etc. 
179 See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Attorneys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for OLC Opinions (May 16, 2005); Memorandum from David J. Barron, 
Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Attorneys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal 
Advice and Written Opinions 1 n.* (Jul. 16, 2010). See also Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 766 (2005) (written responses of Steven Bradbury, 
nominee to the position of Assistant Attorney General for OLC, to questions from Senator Leahy) (“The 
[Guidelines] generally reflect operating principles that have long guided OLC in both Republican and Democratic 
administrations.”), quoted and cited in Morrison, supra note 178, at n. 13-15. 
180 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of 
Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 
U.S.C. § 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), 
http:washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf; superseded by, 
  67 
 
Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of 
Justice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. § 2340–
2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), http://usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm; Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to the Attorney General (Nov. 2, 2001), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2011/03/25/johnyoomemo-for-ag.pdf; Memorandum from John 
C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, for Daniel J. Bryant, 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Re: Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) to Military 
Detention of United States Citizens (June 27, 2002), Memorandum from John C. Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Office 
of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President & William J. Haynes, II, 
General Counsel, Department of Defense, Re: Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities 
Within the United States (Oct. 23, 2001).  See also Dawn E. Johnsen et al., Guidelines for the President’s Legal 
Advisors, 81 IND. L. J. 1345 (2006).  Often, deliberative process protections are claimed to prevent the memos from 
being provided.  Yet some of the memos that have come to light raise disturbing questions in regard to torture, the 
use of coercive interrogation methods, military detention of U.S. citizens, broad intelligence collection, and the 
targeting of U.S. citizens—all outside legislative or judicial eyesight. 
181 Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon, J.).  See also Jaffer & Kaufman. 
182 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1)(D). 
183 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1)(E) 
184 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(2)(A). 
185 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(2)(B). 
186 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C). 
187 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1)(A). 
188 Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989); Elec. Frontier Found. 
V. Dep’t of Justice, 739 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.2014); Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, No. 12-
5223, Apr. 1, 2014. See also Jaffer & Kaufman. 
189 NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).  For an excellent discussion of the working law provision 
and efforts to erode it in regard to OLC opinions, see Jameel Jaffer & Brett Max Kaufman, A Resurgence of Secret 
Law, YALE L. J. FORUM. Nov. 21, 2016. 
190 Sears, 421 U.S. at 153.  See also Jaffer & Kaufman. 
191 Lower courts have followed suit. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 860 
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Taxation with Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue Service, the court considered legal and 
policy memoranda a matter of public record.  Taxation with Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue Service, 646 
F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Service, 117 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1997); National 
Council of LaRaza v. Deparetment of Justice, 411 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2005) (cited and quoted in Jaffer and Kaufman, 
pp. 243-5). See also Electronic Frontier Foundation v. Department of Justice, 739 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S.Ct. 356 (2014) (upholding government claim that the OLC opinion being sought was covered by the 
deliberative process privilege); New York Times Co. v. Department of Justice, 806 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2015). 
(rejected efforts to obtain the legal memoranda that undergirded the government’s targeted-killing program—
despite, just a year earlier, granting access to a heavily redacted version of a memo authorizing the targeted killing 
of a U.S. citizen). 
192 Brief for Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants at 51, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nos. 
15-2956, 15-3122 (XAP) (2d Cir. June 6, 2016), ECF No. 105, cited and quoted in Jaffer and Kaufman, p. 147, n. 
39; Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to Attorneys of the Office of legal Counsel 
(July 16, 2010), cited and quoted in Jaffer & Kaufman, p. 247, n. 35. 
193 H.R. 653, 114th Cong. §2(b)(1)(2016); Jaffer & Kaufman, at 250. 
194 Id. 
195 FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-0185, 130 Stat. 538 (2016); Jaffer & Kaufman, at 250. 
196 The law required that the government have “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are 
relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment).”  USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, §106, 120 Stat. at 196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §1861 (2006)).  DOJ (and the 
court) took the position that all U.S. persons’ telephony metadata was potentially relevant to terrorism investigations 
and therefore fell within the statutory remit.  See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and 
Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014).  This reading collapsed the statutory 
distinction between “relevant” and “irrelevant” records, obviating the NSA’s obligation to discriminate between the 
two.  It rendered the qualifying phrases (e.g., “reasonable grounds”) meaningless.  And the understanding of 
“relevant” contravened Congressional intent.  Id., at 838-843.  It misread “an authorized investigation” (decidedly 
  68 
 
singular and present), as all potential investigations (multiple and future).  It allowed for the collection of 
information that would otherwise mark a threat assessment—thus contradicting one of the statutory conditions.  Id., 
at 843, 847-850.  And it violated the statutory provision that the information must be otherwise obtainable via 
subpoena duces tecum.  Id., at 843-847.  There is no way that any prosecutor in the United States would be allowed 
to collect all Americans’ telephony metadata for nearly a decade, on the off chance that it would be helpful in an 
investigation.  50 U.S.C. §1861(c)(2)(D)(2006).  Indeed, FISC itself recognized that the information could not be 
collected via any other legal instrument.  In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order, BR 08-
13, at 2 (FISA Ct. Mar.2, 2009) (Walton, J.) (stating “Because the collection would result in NSA collecting call 
detail records pertaining to [REDACTED] of telephone communications, including call detail records pertaining to 
communications of United States (U.S.) persons located within the U.S. who are not the subject of any FBI 
investigation and whose metadata could not otherwise be legally captured in bulk, the government proposed 
stringent minimization procedures that strictly controlled the acquisition, accessing, dissemination, and retention of 
these records by the NSA and FBI.”).  Beyond this, the collection of telephony metadata under Section 215 bypassed 
the pen-trap provisions that controlled such collection.  Id., at 858-860. 
197 PCLOB. 
198 Review Group Report. 
199 PPD-68. 
200 ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 805 (2d Cir. 2015). 
201 Klayman v. NSA, 280 F.Supp.Ed. 39 (D.D.C. 2017). 
202 Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, N No. 16-cv-02041-HSG, 2019 WL 1369922 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019). 
203 USA FREEDOM Act, section 602, codified at 50 USC 1872. 
204 In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible 
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, at 6 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).  
205 See Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note , at 863-892. 
206 In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 
1004, 1010 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).  
207 Id., at 1011. 
208 In ACLU v. Clapper, for instance, the government responded to arguments that it had exceeded its authority by 
arguing, “[S]ince May 2006, fourteen separate judges of the FISC have concluded on thirty-four occasions that the 
FBI satisfied this requirement, finding “reasonable grounds to believe” that the telephony metadata sought by the 
Government “are relevant to authorized investigations . . . being conducted by the FBI . . . to protect against 
international terrorism.”  Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 16, Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724.  The government further cited to Judge Eagan’s August 2013 
memorandum opinion in support of its interpretations of “relevance.”  Id. 
209 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring 
(USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268, 402, 602(a), codified at 50 U.S.C. §1872. 
210 By way of example, because FISC opinions were classified, it was not until the unauthorized leaks that the public 
found out that the Court had been allowing NSA officials to make their own determination as to whether there was 
“reasonable, articulable suspicion” (RAS) that a seed identifier proposed for a query of the Section 215 database was 
associated with a particular terrorist organization. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note , at 807. For 
nearly three years, the NSA failed to follow the Court’s direction, despite the fact that numerous NSA officials knew 
about the violation.  When the Court’s order reached the public domain, it was the first time that the public became 
aware of the government’s failure to report noncompliance and the Court’s response. Judge Reggie Walton 
expressed concern “about what appears to be a flagrant violation” of the court’s order.  In re Prod. of Tangible 
Things From [REDACTED], Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No. 
BR 08-13, at 4 (FISA Ct. Jan 28, 2009).  He also immediately ordered a comprehensive review of the system, which 
revealed that as of January 15, 2009, fewer than 2,000 of nearly 18,000 identifiers on the alert list were actually 
supported by RAS.  Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 11, 
In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08- 13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009). Hundreds of reports 
had been issued based on these illegal queries.  Although Judge Walton expressed credulity about the government’s 
claim that the error had been inadvertent, following the government’s final report on the incidents, the FISC allowed 
the NSA to retain the information generated and to again oversee dissemination of the material.  Further documents 
showed that this was far from the only noncompliance incident. See generally Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, 
supra note , at 814-817. 
211 Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 96, a.4, c.  See also R.E. ASHER & J.M.Y. SIMPSON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE AND 
LINGUISTICS, Vol. 4 (1994), p. 2058; Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on Trial in Aquinas’ Court 
  69 
 
of Conscience, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 99 (1988). (“Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to 
be ruled and measured by it.  Hence, in order for a law to obtain the power of obligating, which is proper to law, it 
must be applied to those who are directed by it.  This application takes place by being made known to them by 
promulgation.  Therefore promulgation is necessary for law to have its binding force.”) 
212 Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 96, a.4.  
213 Id. 
214 Aquinas, ST. 
215 Aquinas, ST, q. 90, a. 4. 
216 See generally, LLOYD WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1989). 
217 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
218 David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 154 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 
1996). 
219 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§230 - 287 (1690). 
220 Id.; JEAN JACQUES-ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (DU CONTRAT SOCIAL OU PRINCIPES DU DROIT 
POLITIQUE) (1762). 
221 Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL AND POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 470 (Carl J. Friedrich ed. & trans., 1949) (1795). 
222 David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 155 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 
1996). 
223 Id., at 154. 
224 Id., at 156. 
225 Professor John Rawls considers this “publicity condition” a formal constraint, incorporating it into his approach 
in A Theory of Justice.  Id., quoting and citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 130, 133. 
226 In (ultimately) defending the publicity principle, Professor Luban turns to a series of arguments made about 
whether candor is a quality to be desired in the judicial realm.  Luban notes that four Yale law professors have 
argued against judges being candid about their reasons for deciding cases.  Id., at 157 (discussing the “Yale 
argument”).  Each of the professors’ arguments, however, address issues of political expediency, not legal import.  
Professor Guido Calabresi considers whether judges ought to ignore or bypass anachronistic laws.  Calabresi 1982, 
pp. 174-175.  Professor Charles Black suggests that whilst judges may adopt a rule against torture, they should 
nonetheless be willing to accept it in the true “ticking bomb” scenario.  Black, 1961, discussed in Calabresi 1982, pp. 
173-175.  Professor Alexander Bickel proposes as a “passive virtue” that judges balance decisions on either side of 
the political spectrum.  Bickel, 1962.  By appealing to technical doctrines and avoiding the merits of a case, judges 
will be able to ensure stability.  Id.  And Professor Paul Gewirtz advocates decision-making with an eye towards the 
potential fallout—without any parallel recognition of this consideration in the judicial decision itself.  Gewirts 1983, 
pp. 665-74.  While, ultimately, Calabresi and Gwirtz reject their arguments, as Professor Luban points out, they do 
so only on instrumental grounds—not based on any inherent legal or moral claim. 
227 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, ch. 12 (1980). 
228 JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 272-74 (1998). 
229 As John Austin postulated, “[T]he existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or 
be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.”  John 
Austin, 1832, p. 157.  Austin’s formulation does not mean that the morality of the law is of no consequence.  It 
merely suggests that whether or not a law is desirable, or just, says nothing about whether it actually exists. 
230 Hart writes, “According to my theory, the existence and content of the law can be identified by reference to the 
social sources of the law (e.g., legislation, judicial decisions and social customs) without reference to morality.”  
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 103 (2d ed. 1994). 
231 Hart postulates that within society, there are primary and secondary rules that bind individuals.  The primary ones 
focus on how they should act.  The secondary rules are procedural: namely, they are the rules that determine how the 
primary rules are created, identified, and altered.  A rule of recognition is of the latter type.  Id.  It governs when a 
particular announcement or principle can be considered a rule of obligation: “[T]o say that a given rule is valid is to 
recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition and so as a rule of the system.  We can indeed 
simply say that the statement that a particular rule is valid means that it satisfies all the criteria provided by the rule 
of recognition.”  Id., at 117.  Hart suggests that a rule of recognition lays at the heart of every “fully developed” 
legal system, making it a necessary condition for law.  It does not depend on other rules for its existence.  For a legal 
system to be considered legitimate, two conditions apply: first, citizens (generally) follow the rule of recognition 
(making their actions themselves the determinant); second, officials consider the rule to be a “common standard[] of 
official behavior and appraise critically their own and each other’s deviations as lapses.”  Id. 
  70 
 
232 But note here there may be two opportunities to challenge promulgation.  First, the rule of recognition may 
include within it acknowledgement of secret law; second, the component requiring that officials analyze lapses in 
the rule does not speak to whether the officials, in turn, need to communicate their findings with the population more 
generally.  At most, it could be argued, this places a requirement that all officials (again, raising the question of 
qualifications of which ones ought to be included) be allowed access to information.  
233 In 1832, John Austin attacked natural law theory, articulating the basic precepts of what became legal positivism: 
“The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.  Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it 
be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.  A law, which actually exists, is a law, 
though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and 
disapprobation.”  Austin 1832, Lecture V, p. 157. 
234 KRAMER, supra note , at 101. 
235 LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 47. 
236 Id. 
237 Kramer, at 102. See also Kramer 1999a.  Other scholars have emphasized a similar approach.  See Craig 1997, 
Summers 1993, Tamamnaha 2004, 91-113. 
238 Kramer, at 102.  
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 648-57 (1958). 
243 LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 40. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (1515). 
247 Id. 
248 See, e.g., id., c. 15 (“[I]t is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make 
use of it or not according to necessity.” “[I]t would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities 
that are considered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human conditions do 
not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those 
vices which would lose him his state”; “[H]e need not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices 
without which the state can only be saved with difficulty”). 
249 GIOVANNI BOTERO, THE REASON OF STATE, bk. 1, Trans. by P.J. & D.P. Waley 3 (1956) (defining arcana imperii 
as “Notitia mediorum & rationum, quibus fundatur, firmatur & augentur status.”).  Note that Botero was the writer 
who revived Tacitus’s formulation of arcana imperii.  (See discussion, infra). 
250 Coke to Parliament, Committee of the Whole House, Proceedings and Debates, f. 99, in CD, III, 94–96 (Apr. 26, 
1628), in Sheppard, ed, 3 The Selected Writings of Edward Coke 1266, 1268 (Liberty 2003).  
251 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690), §§134-141. 
252 448 U.S. 569. 
253 In re Oliver 333 U.S. 266 (1948). 
254 333 U.S. 266. 
255 333 U.S. 266. 
256 THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM, (1583), c. 6 (Triall or Judgment by Parliament; c. 8 (Triall by Assise 
or SIJ. Men and First of the Three Parties which Be Necessary in Judgment); c. 10 (Of the Chiefe Tribunals, 
Benches or Courttes of Englande); c. 12 (Of Judges in the Common Lawe of England, and the Mnner of Triall and 
Pleading There). 
257 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONÆ (History of the Pleas of the Crown) (1736). 
258 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765). 
259 Note absence of discussion of the right to a public trial in Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights of 1621, and the Bill of 
Rights of 1689.  For good discussions of the right to a public trial see Harold Shapiro, Right to a Public Trial, 41 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 782 (1951); Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L. Q. 381 (1932); Thomas S. 
Schattenfield, The Right to a Public Trial, 7 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 78 (1955). 
260 Pennsylvania Constitution, Declaration of Rights IX (1776); North Carolina Constitution, Declaration of Rights 
IX (1776); U.S. CONST., 6th Amend. 
261 Shapiro also recognizes these two rights, but he offers different arguments in support of them. 
262 See Hale, The History of the Common Law of England, 290, 291 (1792); 6 Wigmore, Evidence §. 1834 (3 rd Ed. 
1940); 2 Bentham, Rationale on Judicial Evidence 355 (1827), cited in Shapiro, at 784, n. 15-16. 
  71 
 
263 Shapiro, at 784. 
264 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827). 
265 See, e.g., Tate v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 685, 80 S.W.2d 817 (1935); State v. Saale, 308 Mo. 573, 274 S.W 393 
(1925); Commonwealth v. Trinkle, 279 Pa. 564 Atl. 191 (1924); Bishop v. State, 19 Ala. App. 326, 97 So. 169 
(1923); Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917); Wendling v. Commonwealth, 143 KY. 587, 137 S.W. 
205 (1911); Kugadt v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 681, 44 S.W 989 (1898). 
266 See, e.g., Pierpont v. State, 49 Ohio App. 77, 195 N.E. 264 (1934); Makley v. State, 49 Ohio App. 359, 197 N.E. 
339 (1934); Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587, 104 Atl. 53 (1918); United States v. Buck, 24 Fed. Cas. 
1289, No. 14,680 (D. Pa. 1860). 
267 See, e.g., State v. Scrugs, 165 La. 842, 116 So 206 (1928); Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921); People 
v. Tugwell, 32 Cal. App. 520, 163 Pac. 508 (1917). 
268 See, e.g., Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d (1935); Gren v. State, 135 Fla. 17, 184 So. 504 (1938); State 
v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933). 
269 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
270 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
271 19 C.F.R. §210.39(a). 
272 19 C.F.R. §210.39(b). 
273 See generally Laureen A. D’Ambra, The Importance of Conducting In-Camera Testimony of Child Witnesses in 
Court Proceedings: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Relevant Domestic Relations, Juvenile Justice and Criminal 
Cases, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV. L. REV. 323 (2014). 
274 Legal Dictionary, Ex Parte. 
275 See, e.g., D. WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:  A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION (2006); D. ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:  
CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1946-1999 (2002); R. HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN:  CRITICAL 
EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1989); C.R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the 
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, COLUMBIA L. REV. ## (1989); G. Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the 
Administrative State, HARV. L. REV. ## (1994). 
276 See, e.g., Drone Wars: The Full Data, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-01/drone-wars-the-full-data; Conor Friedersdorf, The 
Obama Administration’s Drone-Strike Dissembling, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-obama-administrations-drone-strike-dissembling/473541/. 
277 Jo Becker & Schott Shane, Secret “Kill List” Proves a Test of Obama’s Principle and Will, N. Y. TIMES (May 
29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html. 
278 Id. 
279 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, Terrorism Case Renews Debate over Drone Hits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/us/terrorism-case-renews-debate-over-drone-hits.html.  Despite claims that 
the government’s first preference is to capture individuals on the lists, numerous commentators argued that, as a 
matter of practice, it appeared to be the opposite.  See, e.g., John Brennan, Strengthening our Security by Adhering 
to our Values and Laws, HARV. LAW SCHOOL (Sept. 16, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an. 
280Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40 (Sept. 14, 2001), §2. 
281 War Powers Resolution (1973), §5(b), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§1541-1548. 
282 For the past six years, the executive has claimed that the AUMF provides legal support for its fight against the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—a claim disputed by scholars. For the past six years, the executive has claimed that 
the AUMF provides legal support for its fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—a claim disputed by 
scholars. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, What Is the Domestic Law Basis for U.S. Airstrikes Supporting AMISOM in 
Somalia?, LAWFARE (July 31, 2015), https://lawfareblog.com/what-domestic-law-basis-us-airstrikes-supporting-
amisom-somalia; [NB: See also Louis Fisher, Matt Waxman, Jonathan Turley, etc.] 
283 Memorandum from Matthew Weed, Subject: Presidential References to the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force in Publicly Available Executive Actions and Reports to Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
May 11, 2006, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/pres-aumf.pdf. 
284 Compare, e,g., Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2013) (arguing against an 
expansive battlefield and for an expansive application of international humanitarian law); Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 845 (2009) (arguing against the expanding concept); Jordan 
J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantánamo, the Status of Persons, 
Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335 
  72 
 
(2007); with Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT’L L. J. 293, 312-313 
(2012) (arguing that international humanitarian law would create sanctuaries for violent actors if the concept could 
not expand); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005) (arguing that the AUMF does not limit the battlefield). 
285 Jennifer Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” 
Conflict Zone, 161 UNIV. OF PENN. L. REV. 1165 (2013). 
286 The military’s Joint Special Operations Command has confirmed that several Americans are on the target list.  
Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on Strikes, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012604239_pf.html. 
287 Charlie Savage, Court Releases Large Parts of Memo Approving Killing of American in Yemen, N. Y. TIMES 
(June 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/us/justice-department-found-it-lawful-to-target-anwar-al-
awlaki.html. 
288 New York Times, et. al. v. U.S. Department of Justice, Docket Nos. 13-422(L), 13-445 (Con), June 23, 2014. 
289 Id., p. 13. 
290 See al-Awlaki OLC memo, at 16, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/23/us/23awlaki-memo.html. 
291 Model Penal Code §3.03(2)(b), at 22, OLC memo at 16, 20. 
292 OLC memo at 21. 
293 Id., at 23. 
294 Id., at 24. 
295 Id., at 39-41. 
296 According to the National Registry of Exonerations, since 1989 there have been 2,075 exonerations, with some 
18,062 years lost to false imprisonment.  National Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations by State, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx.  The numbers 
work out to between 23 and 168 people per year.  Id. 
297 Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-
death-penalty. 
298 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 120 (Michael E. Howard & Peter Paret eds., 1976). 
299 Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Pakistan Shift Could Curtail Drone Strikes, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/washington/22policy.html. 
300 David Sanger and Daniel Klaidman on National Security, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, June 22, 2012, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/videos/2012-06-22/david-sanger-and-daniel-klaidman-national-security. 
301 Micah Zenko, Targeted Killings and Signature Strikes, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 16, 2012), 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes; Doyle McManus, U.S. License to Kill, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 18, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/11/world/fg-predator11. 
302 Id. 
303 James Bamford, “He’s in the Backseat!”, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 2006), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/04/-hes-in-the-backseat/304712/. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. 
309 Although officials initially denied it, the Washington Post later reported that the Agency targeted the car, 
knowing that Hijazi was present.  Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen 
on Strikes, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012604239_pf.html.  See also Greg Miller, U.S. citizen in CIA’s Cross 
Hairs, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 31, 2010), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-jan-31-la-fg-cia-
awlaki31-2010jan31-story.html. 
310 Randall Mikkelsen, CIA Says Used Waterboarding on Three Suspects, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2008), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-security-usa-waterboarding/cia-says-used-waterboarding-on-three-suspects-
idUSN0517815120080205 (discussing Michael Hayden’s testimony to SSCI, Feb. 5, 2008). 
311 For a thoughtful treatment of the issues that plague military adjudication of courts martial, military commissions, 
and courts incident to military rule (e.g., martial law or belligerent occupation), see Steven I. Vladeck, Military 
Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L. J. 933 (2015).  Other examples of Article I liberty restrictions include 
immigration proceeding, watch listing, and travel restrictions. 
  73 
 
312 Vladeck, 939, n. 24, citing 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 378 
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1905) (entry for Nov. 28, 1775) (creating rules for the “Regulation of the Navy”); 
2 id. at 111–12 (entry for June 30, 1775) (creating articles of war for the Army).  After ratification of the 
Constitution, Congress formally readopted the Articles of War in 1789.  See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 4, 1 
Stat. 95, 96; see also Act of July 1, 1797, ch. 7, § 8, 1 Stat. 523, 525 (applying the 1775 Articles of War to sailors 
and marines). 
313 American Articles of War of 1776, §XVII, Art. 5, reprinted in 2 Winthrop 1503. 
314 10 U.S.C. §§816 (1), 818(a)-(c). 
315 10 U.S.C. §§816(2), 819. 
316 10 U.S.C. §§816 (1), (2). 
317 10 U.S.C. §§816(3), 820 (Note that summary courts-martial are not available in capital cases, dismissal, 
dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, confinement for more than a month, hard labor without confinement for 
more than 34 days, restrictions for more than two months, or forfeiture of more than 2/3 of one month’s pay). 
318 10 U.S.C. §§817, 877-933. 
319 O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (holding that military tribunals may not try individuals charged with 
crime lacking a “service connection”); Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S. 355 (1971) 
(laying out the factors to be weighed in deciding whether an offense is service-related). 
320 Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 440-441 (1987) (“On reexamination of O’Callahan, we have decided that 
the service-connection test announced in that decision should be abandoned.”). In that case, a general court martial 
tried a sexual abuse charge against an individual serving in the Coast Guard.  Citing Alexander Hamilton in 
Federalist No. 23, the Court considered Congress’s powers to regulate the Armed Forces in Art. I(8)(14) to include 
making laws regarding service members actions, regardless of whether those actions took place within the confines 
of military installations. 483 U.S. 441 (quoting Hamilton, “These powers ought to exist without limitation, because 
it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and 
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.”). 
321 483 U.S. 447-48, citing, inter alia, Goldman v. Weinberger 475 U.S. 509-510 (free exercise of religion); 
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 462 U.S. 300-305 (1983) (racial discrimination); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 
444 U.S. 357, 360 (1980) (free expression); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 425 U.S. 43 (1976) (right to counsel 
in summary court-martial proceedings); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 417 U.S. 756 (1974) (due process rights and 
freedom of expression). 
322 10 U.S.C. §802(a)(10) (emphasis added). Congress included the italicized language to address any potential 
ambiguity regarding the so-called Global War on Terrorism.  During the Vietnam conflict, the Court of Military 
Appeals had understood the language of the UCMJ to require a declaration of war.  United States v. Averette, 19 
C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970), discussed and cited in Vladeck, 942, n. 49.  The 2001 AUMF did not clearly declare war, 
making the Constitutional posture ambiguous. 
323 See Vladeck, at 942; United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 268-69 (C.A.A.F. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2338 
(2013). 
324 In determining what charges to pursue, the convening authority (CA) must consider whether, and to what extent, 
classified information may be involved.  The CA must then request a declassification review and guidance from the 
OCA regarding what can be revealed during the proceedings.  Because of the cumbersome nature of the process, 
convening authorities are encouraged to forgo or dismiss charges that would unnecessarily introduce classified 
information. U.S. Navy, Litigating Classified Cases, c. 9, Military Rule of Evidence 505, at 9-2, 
http://www.jamesmadisonproject.org/files/Navy%20Litigating%20Classified%20Cases/Chapter%20Nine%20-
%20Military%20Rule%20of%20Evidence%20505.pdf. Trial counsel, in turn, “should carefully select case-in-chief 
evidence to avoid having to introduce or provide discovery of any more classified information than is necessary to 
meet the government’s burden.” Id. Under some circumstances, the OCA may not allow certain information used at 
the trial, which may play to the accused’s benefit.  It also may adversely impact the administration of justice.  If they 
make the wrong call on the evidence to be presented, and the individual is not convicted, there also is a cost.  If the 
trial would otherwise result in the defense of others in their life, liberty, or property, and the case cannot continue 
because of the presence of classified material, then there is a harm that is being created by the secrecy.  In addition 
to considerations of justice (and failure to reach a just result), allowing an individual to go free may lead to a repeat 
offense. 
325 In military courts-martial, defendants are not entitled to share classified information with their counsel unless the 
lawyer first obtains a security clearance. See United States v. Schmidt, No. 04-9018-AF (C.A.A.F. 2004) (setting out 
process for attorneys obtaining clearances). In terms of evidentiary rules, unlike ordinary trial conditions, in military 
courts-martial, where classified information is involved, open file discovery is not allowed.  Instead, Military Rule of 
  74 
 
Evidence (MRE) 505, as aforementioned, integrates a CIPA-like procedure, which allows a military department or 
government agency to determine that the disclosure of certain material would prove detrimental to national security. 
See Frederic I. Lederer, The Military Rules of Evidence: Origins and Judicial Implementation, 130 MIL. L. REV. 5 
(1990). The directive covers any information determined by the government pursuant to executive order, statute, or 
regulations, as well as any restricted data, to be classified. See MRE 505 § (b)(1). It conceives of national security 
broadly, to mean anything relative to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States. MRE 505 § (b)(2). 
The CA may delete information from the record, substitute a portion or summary of the information, or substitute a 
statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove. MRE 505 § (d)(1)-(3).  For an 
interesting discussion of how stipulation may be used to the benefit of the defense, see Sam A. Schmidt & Joshua L. 
Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the Government’s Secrecy and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in 
Terrorism Prosecutions, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 69, 84 (2003/04). The CA also may provide the document subject to 
whatever conditions he or she feels are appropriate to guard against the release of information to the accused, or 
withhold disclosure altogether. MRE 505 § (d)(4)-(5). Any objection that the accused may have to the withholding of 
information must be made at a pretrial session. MRE 505 § (e). The military judge must defer to the CA’s decision, 
unless he or she “determines that disclosure of the classified information itself is necessary to enable the accused to 
prepare for trial.”  MRE 505 § (g)(2). The discussion of any government motions is done in camera, ex parte. Id.  If 
the accused is found guilty, the material withheld, and the accused’s objection is placed under seal and forwarded to 
the reviewing authority, the accused may never have the opportunity to review or challenge the material. MRE 505 § 
(g)(4). This issue becomes particularly pronounced in light of the possibility that multiple versions of the same 
classified information may be present in a case. Trial counsel are therefore encouraged “to limit discovery, at least at 
the outset, to a viewing in a secure space, rather than allowing physical custody by the defense.”  
326 The judge may at any point exclude the public from the courts-martial, where classified information may be 
involved.  This option is not available to the ordinary courts under CIPA. So-called Grunden trials carry with them 
an assumption of necessity: they will only be closed to public scrutiny insofar as the convening authority deems it 
necessary to protect the classified information. United States v. Grunden, 2 MJ 116, 120 (CMA 1977).  In Grunden, 
despite the objection of defense counsel, and the trial judge’s assurance that he would protect the appellant’s rights, 
the public was excluded from nearly the entire portion of the trial dealing with an espionage charge.  Of the nine 
witnesses who testified, only one covered classified matters in any depth.  On appeal, the Court found that the right 
to a public trial, secured by the Sixth Amendment, had been violated.  Id.  The burden is on the prosecutor to 
demonstrate the need.  The determination of whether to acquiesce in the prosecution’s request is made during a 
closed meeting. See Mil. R. Evid. 505; R.C.M. 806. Military regulations provide various alternatives to closed 
hearings.  The regulations provide, for instance, for silent witnesses to testify about information contained in a 
classified document, without stating anything about the actual information contained in it, to determine the relevance 
of the information in question.  Courts-martial may use code words or special terms to replace sensitive material, 
such as Person X, Country Y, or Source Z.  The convening authority may make use of screens or disguises to hide 
witnesses’ identities.  Imagery also can be protected from public disclosure by only making it available to 
individuals who have the appropriate clearances. See also ABC Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (ruling  
that Article 32 preliminary hearings must be open to the public, absent a specific and substantial demonstration that 
the proceeding should be closed).  
327 Before the introduction of the UCMJ, as Professor Vladeck notes, the only possibility to obtain review was through 
collateral proceedings, with jurisdiction being the sole issue that could be challenged. Vladeck, at 943. The UCMJ 
altered this by establishing an appellate structure, within which the Courts of Criminal Appeals within each service 
hear appeals from general and, in some cases, general courts-martial. 10 U.S.C. §866. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces provides a third (civilian) layer for appellate review. 10 U.S.C. §867. USCAAF is required to review 
the record in all capital cases, in cases in which the Judge Advocate General orders a CCA case to be sent to them, 
and in cases in which the defendant petitions and the court grants review. 10 U.S.C. §867(a). The law does allow for 
USCAAF decisions to be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari; however, final appeal is only allowable 
when USCAAF itself has agreed to review the case, or when the Judge Advocate General has certified a case to 
USCAAF for review—limiting the right. 28 U.S.C. §1259. 
328 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism,” 66 F.R. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
329 Military Comm’n Order No. 1, U.S. Dep’t of Def., 1, para. 6D(5)(a) (Mar. 21, 2002).  
330 Id., para 6D(5)(b). 
331 Id. 
332 Id., para. 6B(3). 
  75 
 
333 Military Commissions History, Office of Military Commissions, 
http://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/MilitaryCommissionsHistory.aspx. 
334 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); App. To Pet. For Cert. 65a. 
335 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (Stevens, J.). 
336 Geneva Convention, Art. 3. 
337 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (Stevens, J.). 
338 Id., citing 10 U.S.C. §821. 
339 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, Oct. 17, 2006.  The statute defines “unlawful enemy 
combatant” as “a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities 
against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part 
of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of 
Defense.” (10 U.S.C. §948a).  See also Vladeck. 
340 10 U.S.C. §§949a, 949j. See also Vladeck. 
341 10 U.S.C. §950b. See also Vladeck. 
342 10 U.S.C. §950j. See also Vladeck. 
343 10 U.S.C. §949c. See also Vladeck. 
344 10 U.S.C. §949a. See also Vladeck. 
345 10 U.S.C. §948r. See also Vladeck. 
346 See Alan W. Clarke, Rendition to Torture: A Critical Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2009) (history of 
rendition, expansion post-9/11); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
1405 (2008) (rendition previously with aim of bringing individual to trial/not for sending to third party country for 
judicial or extra-judicial proceedings); Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution, 28 REV. LITIG. 
479 (2008) (focusing on Maher Arar and the transfer of more than 100 suspected terrorists to countries that practice 
torture); William G. Waver & Robert M. Pallitto, The Law: “Extraordinary Rendition” and Presidential Fiat, 36 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 102 (2006) (danger of judicial deference to executive expertise); Jules Lobel, Extraordinary 
Rendition and the Constitution, 28 REV. LITIG. 479 (2008) (noting that the practice of rendition for torture violates 
basic principles of international law); Margaret Saterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and 
the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007) (arguing that rendition violates the rule of law); David 
Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2006) 
(noting that rendition and torture violate international law). 
347 The first case to come forward under the 2007 Manual for Military Commissions (which implemented the 2006 
MCA) was that of David Hicks, who pled guilty and was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for providing 
material support to terrorists.  Notably, the system at the time allowed for significant amounts of secret information 
to be used against defendants, raising the possibility that secrecy could be used to encourage guilty pleas—
essentially, a second-order effect. 
348 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (consolidated with Al Odah v. United States). 
349 United States v. Hamdan, Panel Member Instructions, AE 321 (Mil. Comm. Aug. 4, 2008). 
350 Hamdan v. U.S., 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
351 Hamdan v. U.S., 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
352 Al Bahlul v. United States, 2013 WL 297726 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam), en banc rev. granted and 
panel order vacated, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 23, 2013) (en banc).  
353 10 U.S.C. §§948a(6), 948d; 904; 906; 950t, discussed in Vladeck, 946, n. 90-93. 
354 Title XVIII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111-84, H.R. 2647, 123 Stat. 
2190, Oct. 28, 2009 (Military Commissions Act of 2009). 
355 The government immediately attempted to use the law to introduce new charges against Ibrahim al Qosi, a 
Sudanese captive held at Guantánamo Bay, against whom the Pentagon had sworn out charges two years prior.  Air 
Force Lt. Col. Nancy Paul, the presiding officer, denied the government’s request.  Carol Rosenberg, Guantánamo 
Judge Won’t Expand Sudanese Captive’s War Crimes Case, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 3, 2009), 
http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.miamiherald.com%2Fnews%2Famericas%2Fguanta
namo%2Fstory%2F1364075.html&date=2009-12-04. 
356 Remarks of the Attorney General, Attorney General Announces Forum Decisions for Guantánamo Detainees, 
Nov. 13, 2009, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-announces-forum-decisions-guantanamo-
detainees 
  76 
 
357 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Al-Nashiri v. Obama, Mar. 20, 2017, p. 3, https://www.lawfareblog.com/nashiri-
files-cert-petition-habeas-case. 
358 8 CFR §3.27 (“All hearings, other than exclusion hearings, shall be open to the public” [with exceptions noted]). 
359 8 CFR §3.27(a). 
360 8 CFR §3.27(b). 
361 8 CFR §3.27(c). 
362 See discussion, infra, and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
363 Email memorandum from Hon. Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to all Immigration Judges and 
Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001).  See also Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: 
Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 95 
(2004); Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September 11 Detainees, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(August 2002). 
364 Email memorandum from Hon. Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to all Immigration Judges and 
Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), at ¶¶10, 11. 
365 Id. 
366 Id. 
367 Letter to Senator Carl Levin, Chair, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, from Daniel J. Bryant, 
assistant attorney general, July 3, 2002. 
368 Rabih Haddad v. John Ashcroft et al, 221 F.Supp.2d 799 (2002). 
369 221 F.Supp.2d 802-803, quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
370 “ A deportation proceeding, although administrative, is an adversarial, adjudicative process, designed to expel 
non-citizens from this country.  "[T]he ultimate individual stake in these proceedings is the same as or greater than 
in criminal or civil actions."  See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.J.2002).  
"[D]eportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile," Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391, 68 S. Ct. 
10, 92 L. Ed. 17 (1947), and the Court has taken note of the "drastic deprivations that may follow when a resident of 
this country is compelled by our [g]overnment to forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a foreign land when he 
often [may] have no contemporary identification."  Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285, 87 S. Ct. 483, 17 L. Ed. 2d 
362 (1966).  Moreover, "[t]hough deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on 
the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom."  Bridges, 326 U.S. at 
154, 65 S. Ct. 1443.  As such, "[t]hat deportation is a penalty at times a most serious one cannot be doubted." Id. at 
154, 65 S. Ct. 1443.” Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir.2002), cited and quoted in 221 F.Supp.2d 
804. See also E.G., Fizgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C.Cir. 1972); Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F.Supp. 115 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
371 221 F.Supp.2d 804. 
372 221 F.Supp.2d 804. 
373 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. John Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
374 Id. 
375 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. John Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
376 Id. 
377 8 CFR Part 3; EOIR 133; AG Order No. 2585-2002; Fed. Reg. 67(102), May 28, 2002, *36799. 
378 Id. 
379 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat. §411, Oct. 6, 19167, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§95a-95b and 50 
U.S.C. App. §§1-44. 
380 Id. 
381 Daniel A. Gross, The U.S. Confiscated Half a Billion Dollars in Private Property During WWI, SMITHSONIAN 
(July 28, 2014), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/us-confiscated-half-billion-dollars-private-property-
during-wwi-180952144/. 
382 Exec. Order 9095, Mar. 11, 1942 (Wilson).  
383 Id., ¶ 3. Leo Crowley, former chair of the FDIC, served as APC, obtaining a wide range of businesses.  In 1946, 
the functions transferred to the Attorney General. Exec. Order 9788, Oct. 15, 1946.  That office was not formally 
abolished until 1966. Exec. Order 11281, May 13, 1966 (Johnson). 
384 Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 USC s 1702(a)(1) (1977). 
385 50 USC § 1702(a)(I)(B) (2001). 
386 Executive Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,079 (23 January 1995), reprinted as amended in 50 USCA. s 1701 
(2003). 
  77 
 
387 Id.  The definition of specially designated terrorist as found in 31 CFR 595.311 reads: “(1) Persons listed in the 
Annex to Executive Order 12947; (2) Foreign persons designated by the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, because they are found: (i) to have committed, or to pose a 
significant risk of committing, acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of disrupting the Middle East peace 
process, or (iii) To assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or services in 
support of, such acts of violence; and (3) Persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with 
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, any other 
specially designated terrorist.” 
388 Executive Order No. 13099, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,167 (20 August 1998). 
389 Executive Order No. 13224, (23 September 2001), 3 CFR 786, 790. 
390 Id. 
391 18 U.S.C. §§2339A-2339(B).  See also Laura K. Donohue, U.S. Efforts to Stem the Flow of Funds to Terrorist 
Organizations: Export Controls, Financial Sanctions and Material Support, in DIRTY ASSETS:  EMERGING ISSUES IN 
THE REGULATION OF CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST ASSETS 261 (Colin King & Clive Walker eds., 2014). 
392 Watch listing provides a good example:  as Professor Anya Bernstein has noted, “Reports indicate that people are 
commonly listed in terrorist watch lists based on suspicions ranging from the constitutionally impermissible to the 
absurd.”  Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 BUFFALO L. REV. 461, 466 (2013). Being 
Quaker or member of a pro-gun lobby appear to be sufficient. Id., at 467. Despite a high error rate, the 
Transportation Security Administration operated its passenger screening programs for years without any method to 
either report or to correct errors.  Id., citing Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal 
Framework, 43 HARV. C. R. – C. L. L. REV. 435, 475 (2008). Due process was nowhere to be found.  
     The No-Fly list proves similarly relevant. The Terrorist Screening Center maintains a Terrorist Screening 
Database to which the FBI and National Counterterrorism Center contribute the names of known or suspected 
terrorists, who are then prevented from flying. Congressional Research Service, The Terrorist Screening Database 
and Preventing Terrorist Travel, Nov. 7, 2016. See also Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122 (9 th Cir. 2012).For a 
significant amount of time after the list was created, the government refused to tell people they were on it—even 
after they had been prevented from flying—let alone the reasons why. See Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
     The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an interagency committee that reviews 
transactions involving foreign investment that may undermine U.S. national security, does not publicly acknowledge 
the deals they are inspecting. Far from becoming less invasive, in September 2019, Treasury published proposed 
regulations to implement the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, which broadened 
CFIUS’s authority to look at investments that had previously fallen outside its jurisdiction. Instead of just 
transactions that could result in foreign control of a U.S. business, the agency can look at either direct or indirect 
non-controlling investments, by a foreign person, that affords that individual access to technical information, certain 
rights, or a role in substantive decisionmaking. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Proposed CFIUS 
Regulations to Implement FIRRMA, Sept. 17, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Proposed-FIRRMA-
Regulations-FACT-SHEET.pdf. 
